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Since the 1970 's profit policy has been used as a
vehicle to motivate capital investment in productive
facilities and equipment. The current policy has increased
the factors available for use when determining a profit/fee
objective in order to increase this incentive. Defense
contractors and Government procurement personnel are
interviewed for their perceptions of the effectiveness of
the current policy to incentivize capital expenditures in
facilities and equipment. The results of the survey showed
that: (1) profit policy has been ineffective in
incentivizing defense contractors to invest in more
productive facilities and equipment; (2) it is not an
important factor when deciding on the contractor's capital
budget; and (3) profit policy is not being implemented as
originally intended. Recommendations include: (1)
encouraging greater use of more direct incentives for
capital investment; (2) the need for greater accountability
of Government procurement personnel on implementation of the
policy; and (3) DoD should review and restate the objectives
of the policy so the Services have a clear understanding of
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has attempted to use
profit policy since the 1970' s as a method to incentivize
defense contractors to make investments in more productive
facilities and equipment. This concern over productivity is
based in part on the continuing cost growth of major weapon
systems and reports of a declining defense industrial base.
Numerous studies have been conducted to determine the
effect of profit policy and to make recommendations on
improving it. These studies have focused on among other
things: (1) the defense industry's profitability as
compared to commercial goods manufacturers, (2) impact of
profit policy and other government actions on the defense
industry, and (3) the need to increase capital investment
for productivity gains.
The current DoD or "Final Rule" policy was implemented
on 1 August 1987. It was published as Defense Acquisition
Circular 86-5 and is now contained in DoD Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) part 215, subpart
215. 9-prof it. It provides Government procurement personnel
a structured approach, through the use of Weighted
Guidelines (WGL) , for developing a profit objective on
negotiated contracts. The policy's stated purpose is to
provide a consistent manner in which to reward risk,
motivate efficient and quality performance and to motivate
capital investment in the defense industrial base.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The purpose of this research is to assess the
effectiveness of DoD profit policy in motivating capital
investment in the defense industry. This assessment is
based on interviews with the defense industry and Government
procurement personnel. Additionally the factors that
determine capital investment and application of policy are
addressed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the preceding objectives, the following primary
research question was posed: Has current DoD profit policy
been an incentive for capital investment in the defense
industry?
The following secondary research questions are deemed
pertinent to this research effort:
1. How important is DoD profit policy in capital
investment decision making?
2. What factors other than DoD profit policy affect the
defense industry's capital investment decisions?
3. Are current policy guidelines being followed by DoD
contracting officers so that contractors can depend
upon increased profits if they make productivity
enhancing capital expenditures?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The focus of this research is on the ability of the
Facilities Capital Employed (FCE) factors in current profit
policy to incentivize capital investment. It also evaluates
the importance of these factors in the capital investment
decision making process and investigates other factors that
motivate capital investment in the defense industry.
There have been a wide range of studies and reports done
on the topic of profit policy and productivity enhancement
of the defense industry. They provide an extreme range of
views and opinions on the particular problem which are open
to a wide degree of interpretation. Additionally there are
numerous factors which can and do effect the defense
industry's decision to invest in capital equipment. This
thesis is limited mainly to the effect that DoD profit
policy and its implementation has had on those decisions and
only briefly addresses other factors that have an impact on
those decisions.
Another limitation to this research was the inability to
gain access to the DD 1547 data base for information on FCE
factors applied since current policy implementation. Due to
data retrieval problems at OSD the information would not




The methodology employed in this research consisted of
three components: (1) development of a literature base, (2)
interviews of defense contractors, and (3) interviews of
Government procurement personnel. The literature base was
developed using the Defense Technical Information Center,
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange and the
Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Telephone interviews were conducted with defense contractors
and Government procurement personnel using a standard
questionnaire for each respective group. Twenty-five of the
top defense contractors, based on prime contract obligations
during fiscal year 1988, were asked to participate.
Government procurement personnel were selected from the
Departments of the Air Force, Army and Navy. The data
collected are presented in tables throughout the study.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is organized in six chapters. The first
chapter is an introduction to the thesis. Chapter II
provides a historical perspective of the past policies and
events that have lead to current policy. This background
account is presented to provide a framework for
understanding how and why current policy was developed to
incentivize capital investment. The third chapter presents
the interview development. Chapter IV presents the
interview questions and responses given by defense
contractors and Government procurement personnel. The fifth
chapter provides an analysis of the data presented. Chapter





A review of past DoD profit policies and their ability
to incentivize defense contractors to make capital
expenditures should be discussed prior to examining the
effectiveness of current policy. This chapter will present
DoD's concern relating to the capital investment by defense
contractors in more productive cost reducing equipment and
the different efforts taken to address the problem. Past
and current profit policies are addressed along with the
problems and concerns that have given rise to them.
B. PROFIT POLICY BACKGROUND
Concerns over the level of capital investment in the
defense industry has been a matter of study for many years.
Prior to 1964 profit determination on negotiated contracts
'i
was unstructured. Policy required contracting officers to
consider various factors when determining a profit
objective. These factors included the degree of risk,
nature of work to be performed, extent of government
assistance, extent of contractor investment, and other
performance factors. The policy failed to provide guidance
as to the weights that should be accorded to the various
factors and the manner in which these considerations were to
be used in a profit objective. [Ref. l:p. 1071]
In 1964, DoD revised its Profit Policy to a more
structured approach based on a study done by the Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) . This approach was based on
Weighted Guidelines (WGL) where specific weights were
assigned to a contractor's: [Ref. 2:p. 33]
1. Input to Total Performance.
2. Assumption of Cost Risk.
3. Performance.
4. Other selected factors.
This initial attempt at structuring profit policy
received early criticism for its heavy emphasis on estimated
co_s_£ as a basis for establishing the profit objective and
the inadequate consideration given to the financial
resources used by contractors. LMI, in a follow-on study
done in 1967, found that the WGL actually acted as a
negative incentive for contractor investment. This was based
in part on the emphasis of cost for determining profit. The
study concluded that the WGL method provided incentives for
cost escalation and acted as a disincentive for investment
in cost reducing plant and equipment [Ref. 2:p. 35].
A General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress in
1971 on Defense Profit Policy found that: [Ref. 3:p. 2]
. . . by relating profits to costs, contractors in non-
competitive situations are not provided with positive
incentives to make investments in equipment that would
increase efficiency and result in reduced costs,
especially where follow-on contracts are involved.
The report also went on to recommend, in broad terms, that
profit policy should be revised to include a greater
consideration to capital investment.
Responding to the criticism on WGL
t) DoD developed its
first policy on contractor capital employed in December
1972. This policy was published in Defense Procurement
Circular (DPC) 107. It established a method to base profits
on return-on-investment . It provided that 50% of the profit
would be based on the contractor's facilities and operating
capital investment [Ref l:p. 1072]. The policy was made
optional based on the agreement of the government and
contractor. Initially supported by industry and DoD, DPC
107 was found to be too complex and received little use. It
was phased out in 1975. [Ref. 2:p. 45]
Even though DPC 107, DOD's Profit on Capital Policy,
failed, there was still concern over the disincentives in
DoD's profit policy. There was also rising concern in DoD
over the apparent erosion of the defense industrial base.
This perception was based on the growing necessity for sole-
source contracts, increases in production lead time for
defense products, more dependency on foreign production of
critical components, and insufficient improvement in





In May 1975 the DoD initiated a major study of
profit and its relationship to capital investment and
increased productivity. The goal of this 16 month study,
known as Profit '76, was to "develop any policy revisions
considered necessary to encourage private investment in
equipment and the associated reductions in costs." [Ref.
2:p. 8]
Profit '76 was comprehensive and one of the major
efforts of its kind. The study analyzed the earnings and
investments of over 200 defense contractors and compared
them with similar data from commercial industries [Ref. 4:p.
7]. At the same time opinion surveys on profit issues were
gathered from Government, industry and financial
communities. The key findings of the study were as follows:
[Ref. 5:p. xii]
1. The pre-tax return on investment (ROI) for defense
business profit centers was higher than comparable
durable goods industries.
2. The amount of capital investment per sales was higher
for durable goods industries than for defense business
centers.
3. The pre-tax return on sales ratio of realized profits
was higher for durable goods industries than defense
business profit centers.
4. The pre-tax ROS actually realized on government
contracts was significantly less (approximately 46
percent) than the profit rate negotiated by
contracting officers.
Some of the conclusions from Profit '76 that pertain
to this research are: [Ref. 4:p. 8]
1. That government contractors were able to maintain a
high return on investment by keeping investment low.
2. DoD was missing productivity gains that could be
realized through higher levels of investments.
3. Investments resulting in increased productivity could
decrease the cost of production and thereby reduce the
cost to the government.
In response to the study DoD revised its profit
policy for negotiated contracts.
2 . Defense Procurement Circular 76-3
These revisions were promulgated in Defense
Procurement Circular (DPC) 76-3 in September 1976. DPC 76-3
made two major changes to DoD profit policy with the hopes
of overcoming contractor reluctance to invest in modern
facilities and machinery. The first change made the imputed
cost of contractors 1 facility capital investments, as
outlined in Cost Accounting Standard 414, an allowable cost
on most negotiated contracts. The second change made the
level of facility investment a factor in reaching a
prenegotiated profit objective under the WGL method [Ref.
4:p. 10]. The revisions are outlined in Table 1.
From the outset of the new policy it was recognized
that the relative weight of the contractor's capital invest-
ment (10%) was too low and would likely have to be increased
in the future. It was felt that these changes would remove
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* Some of the factors, such as productivity were not
eliminated but their precise weighting was indefinite.
Source: [Ref. l:p. 1072]
investment decisions [Ref. 4:p. 10]. In his statement to
the Joint Committee on Defense Production on the purpose of
these revisions, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated:
[Ref. 5:p. 9]
We feel that our new profit policy and the allowance of
the imputed cost of capital will help remove obstacles to
cost-reducing facility investment decisions by industry.
These policy changes are a step in the right direction and
should reduce the DOD acquisition cost by improving the
viability and productivity of our defense industrial base.
Follow-on analysis of the effects of DPC 76-3
relative to contractor investment in equipment and
facilities revealed that contractors had not taken advantage
of the investment incentive aspects of the profit policy to
increase productivity [Ref. 6:p. 13]. Two additional
studies were conducted in 1979 to determine the effects of
11
the 1976 profit policy change. The GAO and DoD found that
the overall level of profit had increased with little
indication that contractors had responded positively to
upgrading facilities and equipment. An examination of the
practical experience with DPC 7 6-3 revealed that there were
four major weaknesses [Ref. 2:p. 42].
1. The return on facilities investment was not adequate
to be a positive motivation for contractors to
increase their facilities investment.
2. Policy guidance for assigning weight to the contract
cost risk factor was not sufficient.




The relationship between R&D and service contract
profit levels was not desirable.
3 . Defense Acquisition Circular 76-23
In February 1980 the policy was revised to address
most of the weaknesses listed above. DoD promulgated
Defense Acquisition Circular (DAC) 7 6-23 to address these
weaknesses. Specifically, the profit factor for capital
employed was increased from a range of six to ten percent to
a range of 16 to 20 percent. The WGL were modified to
provide separate profit weight ranges for manufacturing, R&D
and service contracts. Third, the risk factors among
contract types were significantly changed to separate
factors for cost and multiple incentives [Ref. 5:p. 11].
The intent of the percentage change in facilities investment
factor was to place more emphasis on the facilities
12
investment portion of negotiated profits thereby enticing
defense contractors to increase capital investment [Ref.
7:p. 19].
4. Profit '82
In 1982 the Air Force Systems Command initiated a
study to examine the continued relevance of the current
profit policy in today's business environment and to
determine whether the desired objectives underlying the
profit policy revisions of DPC 76-3 and DAC 76-23 were
achieved [Ref. 5:p. 1]. In its attempt to answer these
questions it emulated as closely as possible the events and
data used in Profit '76. One of the objectives of Profit
'82 directly relates to this research. It is, "has the
profit policy stimulated investment in contractor facilities
capital within the defense industry." [Ref. 5: p. 1]. Some
of the findings relevant to this question and this research
are: [Ref. 5:pp. 53-56]
1. By itself, profit will not induce 'capital investment.
2. The structure of DPC 76-3 did not adequately reward
capital investment.
3. The profit policy changes under DAC 76-23
significantly reduced the potential impact of profit
on capital investment.
4. Recognition of capital employed profit has not
motivated contractor investment.
5. DoD profit policy lacks credibility.
13
Profit '82 went on to make the following recommendations on
capital investment and productivity with respect to profit
policy: [Ref. 5:pp. 57-58]
1. DOD must have realistic expectations of the true
relationship between profit policy and capital
investment.
2. DoD should rescind DAC 76-23.
3. DoD should revitalize the special productivity factor.
Profit '82 also noted that even with the use of a capital
facility investment incentive in profit, capital investment
on defense contracts as a percentage of total contract costs
did not change during the 1977-1981 period [Ref. 5:p. 53].
It should be noted that both DPC 76-3 and DAC 76-23
used cost as a primary basis for determining profits. In
fact, after DAC 76-23, cost still determined 72 percent of
the total profit objective [Ref. 8:p. 17]. Even with the
additional emphasis on facilities capital employed put in
place by DAC 76-23 little additional increase in capital
investment in plant and equipment was occurring. With the
continued emphasis on cost based pricing for government
contracts, any productivity cost reductions implemented
would result in lower costs to the contractor. This equated
to lower profits as well since profit was determined as a
percentage of cost. Therefore the only direct result
contractors could expect from capital improvement
investments was reduced profits [Ref. 9:pp. 5-11].
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5. Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)
Still not satisfied with its profit policy the
Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Defense
Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR) in December 1983.
This full scale study was to review contract pricing,
financing and profit (markup) policies and to make
recommendations to provide for appropriate integration of
the policies [Ref. 10:p. i] . DFAIR was comparable in scope
to Profit '76 and conducted a comprehensive study with the
support of selected government officials, representatives of
industry and professional associations, CPA firms, the
Logistics Management Institute and the Conference Board
[Ref. l:p. 1073]. A distinctive aspect of the DFAIR report
was its recognition of the interrelationships among profit,
financing and other factors. It provided a more complete
picture of profit policy. DFAIR 1 s overall conclusion was:
[Ref. 10:p. E-l]
...that current contract pricing, financing, and markup
policies are balanced economically, are protecting the
interests of the taxpayer, and are enabling U.S. industry
to achieve an equitable return for its involvement in
defense business. Analysis of industry financial and
investment trends indicates that the goals of many of the
previous policy changes are being realized, although there
are a number of refinements and improvements which need to
be made.
Of particular interest to this research are the four
specific conclusions DFAIR made on capital investment and
efficiency improvements. It reported that though
significant capital investment had been made by defense
15
contractors the rate of change had been driven by factors
other than DoD profit policy. It also stated that current
profit policy is indifferent to productivity of capital
investments and that in and of itself is insufficient to
bring about productivity-enhancing improvements. [Ref.
10:p. E-2]
DFAIR also recommended that overall policy should be
simplified and better integrated with financing policy and
length of contract performance. It also stated that
modifications should be made to yield profit results that
average . 5 to 1 point lower than results achieved under DAC
76-23 [Ref. l:p. 1074]. Like other studies done before, it
recommended that increased emphasis should be placed on
investment and that facilities capital employed should be
based on productivity and risk of assets. It also
recommended that efforts to motivate contractors to acquire
productivity enhancing capital and to make other
productivity changes should be pursued on an extra
contractual, plant-wide basis [Ref. 10:pp. ix, 6-7].
As a result of the DFAIR study DoD issued a revised
profit policy adopting many of the recommendations in
September 1986. While this proposal was undergoing review,
its implementation was mandated in the continuing
appropriation resolution P.L. 99-50 on October 18, 1986.
The statutory requirement is quoted below: [Ref. l:p. 1070]
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Provided that for solicitations issued after the effective
date of this Act which require price negotiation,
contracts may only be awarded if such negotiation is based
on new profit calculation procedures which provide for
increased emphasis on facilities capital employed and
contractor risk and which procedures do not provide an
explicit fixed rate for working capital and which do not
include profit based on specific individual elements of
contract cost.
The final rule, DoD Profit Policy (DAC 86-5) , DFARS subpart
215.9, was issued on 1 August 1987 and is the current
policy.
C. CURRENT PROFIT POLICY
The current profit policy made several substantial
changes from earlier policy. One major change was to remove
specific elements of contract cost as a determinate of
profit. It moved to try to provide a consistent manner for
rewarding risk. For the first time, a working capital
adjustment in profit determinations was included.
Of particular interest to this research is that
incentives on facilities capital employed are now split into
two categories: buildings and equipment. Land would no
longer receive any risk markup. This was accomplished to
discriminate between assets which are likely to be more
productivity enhancing from those that are not [Ref.
10:p.ix, 11]. Markups for these categories are ten to 20
percent for buildings and 20 to 50 percent for equipment.
The policy does recognize that the methods used to allocate
facilities capital employed may produce disproportionate
17
allocations to research and development and service type
contracts. In such cases the government contracting officer
is advised to use alternate values.
DoD again is trying to encourage and reward aggressive
capital investment in facilities that benefit DoD by
substantially increasing the factors assigned to facilities
capital employed (FCE) . Table 2 reviews FCE incentives




WGL/1964 DPC 76-3 DAC 76-23 DAC 86-5
Markup All All
Category Contracts Contracts Manf . R&D/Ser . Manf . R&D/Ser
Land 0% 6-10% 16-20% 0% 0% 0%
Buildings 0% 6-10% 16-20% 0% 10-20% 0-10%
Facilities 0% 6-10% 16-20% 0% 20-50% 15-25%
Source: [Refs. l:p. 1082; 10:p. v-17]
The current DoD Profit Policy is attached as Appendix A.
D. POST DFAIR STUDIES
The following studies have continued the debate on what
is an appropriate profit policy. They also address, to some
extent, the ability to motivate capital investment.
18
1. GAP Assessment of the DFAIR Study
In December 1986 the GAO released its assessment of
DoD's DFAIR study. This study was prepared at the request
of House and Senate Congressional Committees. It requested
an evaluation of the validity of DFAIR 'S findings and
appropriateness of its recommendations.
The GAO agreed that the overall study provided a
good basis for evaluating DoD profit policy. It also agreed
that the interrelationship between contract pricing,
financing and profit policy should be examined. However,
because of what GAO considered major flaws in the study, it
concluded that the DFAIR recommendations were not based on
adequate analysis. It states: [Ref. ll:p. 56]
. . .We believe the report inaccurately portrays the
comparative profitability of defense firms, understates
contractor profit objectives under DFAIR' s proposed
weighted guidelines policy, and understates contractors'
contract financing requirements.
It goes on to recommend that DFAIR should not be used for
developing a profit policy.
This recommendation was based in part on GAO's
disagreement with DFAIR 's use of progress payments in the
contractors' asset base when determining ROA and the
development of its own definition of economic profit. The
GAO also concluded that the one percent reduction in profit
objective, from 12.3 to 11.5 percent, sought by DFAIR would
not be achieved, but in fact could increase to as much as
12.7 percent. [Ref. ll:p. 66]
19
The DoD recognized that there will be continuing
differences of opinion when measuring profitability.
However, it felt that this difference of opinion should not
be the basis for delaying needed reform.
One finding that relates to this research was the
DFAIR analysis of contractor capital investment. It states:
[Ref. ll:p. 54]
Relying on two measures of investment, we conclude that
although defense contractor investment has increased over
the period 1974-1983, it has lagged behind the
corresponding rate of increase for non-defense firms,
therefore, defense firms continue to exhibit low relative
investment compared with non-defense firms, and the gap
appears to be widening. This contradicts DFAIR'
s
suggestion that the gap is narrowing. Moreover, as the
percentage of a firm's total sales represented by defense
increases, its relative investment declines.
2. The MAC Study
The defense industry, concerned with the cumulative
impact of legislative and regulatory changes that had taken
place between 1984-1987, commissioned the MAC group to
perform an analysis of the impact of these changes on the
defense industry. This study, The Impact on Defense
Industrial Capability of Changes in Procurement and Tax
Policy, 1984-1987, is commonly referred to as the MAC study,
Its purpose was to analyze the combined impact of the
changes in the context of defense procurement risks and
returns, and the implications for our national defense [Ref.
12:p. 1].
20
The report focused on six categories of change in
tax law and DoD policies and applied them to nine existing
programs. It then went on to assess the impact of these
changes in the programs. The study's findings related to
this research included: [Ref. 12:pp. 2-4]
1. The return on investment on the programs analyzed
would have been less than the return necessary to
preserve shareholder value. .
.
2. Profits will be substantially reduced-by an average of
23 percent on the companies' defense business.
3. Companies will be forced to borrow heavily, but the
additional financing required will, for some
companies, likely exceed that which can be borrowed.
4. As companies feel the squeeze on available capital,
they will be forced to:
...Reduce investment needed for productivity
enhancement and modernization. . .
.
The study goes on to report that CEOs faced with tight funds
would be required to cut back on capital investment.
Something that is directly opposite of what Congress and DoD
are trying to incentivize. It states: [Ref. 12 :p. 35]
The total capital invested by the industry (for defense
and commercial purposes) is large relative to the cash
flow generated by its profits... If income were to decline,
and facing unreceptive capital markets, the industry could
look to reduced capital expenditures to help close the
gap. If defense capital expenditures are projected to
result in higher risk, lower returns, they will suffer
more than commercial investment.
The study goes on to conclude that a more
coordinated approach to changes in policy needs to occur
with some form of assessment of the policy's effects before
it is implemented. It also charges Congress and DoD to
21
develop a clearer plan of what the defense industry should
be in the future so that procurement policies can be tested
against their requirements. [Ref. 12:pp. 43-44]
3 . Navy Studies
The Navy has sponsored a report from RRG Associates
entitled Financial Analysis of Major Defense Contractors,
since 1984. Prepared annually, its approach is to analyze
individual companies in detail by using published annual
financial and Security Exchange Commission 10K reports of
the companies studied. The study focuses on the relative
profitability and reinvestment rates of segments that do
business with the U.S. Government and for segments that sell
to Commercial customers. [Ref. 13: p. 1]
These studies have concluded that the defense
segments of the selected defense industry companies were
less profitable than the commercial segments from 1977
through 1980 and have been relatively more profitable than
these segments since then. They have also concluded that
from 1979 through 1982 and from 1985 through 1987 both
commercial corporations and the commercial segments of the
defense companies had a greater relative rate of




The ability of profit policy to incentivize capital
investment is still a question. The studies cited in this
research all mentioned that the incentive built into the
policy did little to increase the capital investment of
defense contractors. This trend seems to be continuing with
this current policy. The Navy in an analysis of its FY 88
contract actions found that there was no indication of major





Profit policy has been a method used by DoD to
incentivize defense contractors in making investments in
capital facilities. A primary objective of Profit '76, DPC
76-3, DAC 76-23 and to some extent DFAIR and DAC 86-5 was to
achieve cost reductions through increased capital investment
by modifying profit policy to incentivize capital
investment.
It is important to understand the policy, its
development and current position to better analyze the
effects of current policy.
The next chapter will provide information on the
background and development of the surveys and interviews




The previous chapter introduced how DoD has attempted to
motivate capital investment through the use of profit
policy. As each major policy review was undertaken, a
larger percentage of profit on negotiated contracts was
based on facilities capital employed (FCE) . Current DoD
profit policy has again increased the emphasis on FCE to
encourage capital investment. A review of the literature
indicates that previous attempts to use profit policy as a
means to incentivize capital investment have not been
successful. In an attempt to determine whether current
profit policy has been able to motivate capital investment,
interviews of defense contractors and Government procurement
personnel were undertaken.
B. INTERVIEW BACKGROUND
The interviews were used to determine if current DoD
profit policy has acted as an incentive for capital
investment in the defense industry. To do this the
researcher interviewed defense industry personnel, the
people affected by current policy, and government
procurement personnel, the implementors of the policy.
Interviews were conducted using a standard set of questions
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tailored for each group. The defense industry questionnaire
is in Appendix B and the Government procurement personnel
questionnaire is in Appendix C.
Interview questions were developed from a review of
available literature, Profit '76, DFAIR, previous profit
policy, FCE, and thesis studies.
Telephone interviews were conducted with both groups.
To encourage frank and open discussion all interviews were
conducted on a non-attribution basis.
C. DEFENSE INDUSTRY INTERVIEW DEVELOPMENT
Twenty-five of the top defense firms were asked to
participate in this research. The firms chosen were the top
25 by total dollar value of prime contract obligations
awarded by the military Services or DoD in 1988. A list of
the companies is in Appendix D.
The researcher interviewed top managers at corporate
headquarters or the company's prime defense division who are
involved in the capital investment decision making process.
This provided the researcher a better understanding of how
capital investment decisions were made and how DoD profit
policy affects these decisions. The objective of the
interview was to ask questions which would answer the
primary and secondary questions of this thesis from the
defense contractors view. These are:
1. Has current DoD profit policy been an incentive for
capital investment?
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2. How important is DoD profit policy in capital
investment decision making?
3. What factors other than DoD profit policy affect
capital investment decisions?
A standard questionnaire was sent to participating
defense contractors. A follow-up telephone interview was
than conducted to obtain views and comments in the following
areas:
1. DoD profit policy as an incentive for capital
investment.
2. Company changes to adopt current profit policy.
3. Defense contractor criteria/factors considered for
capital investment in defense and commercial ventures.
4. Defense contractor profit/fee objectives on negotiated
contracts.
5. Government procurement personnel use of and
recommended changes to profit policy.
The initial questions in the questionnaire helped the
researcher to get a general impression on how current policy
has been perceived. Other questions were used to determine
the onqoinq need for capital investment and the decision
making process that is used. Questions asking to compare
capital investment decisions for defense work and commercial
work were also asked to determine the differences, if any,
in this process. Finally, questions also addressed how
defense contractors determine profit objectives, the use of
WGL and any need for improvement to profit policy.
The questions asked and a summary of Defense contractors
responses are included in the following chapter.
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D. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT PERSONNEL INTERVIEW DEVELOPMENT
Fifty Government procurement personnel were interviewed
to obtain a better understanding of how current profit
policy was being applied. This researcher targeted
Procuring Contracting Officers (PCOs) and contract
negotiators because of their direct involvement in contract
negotiations and application of DoD profit policy.
Personnel selected were from the Services' major buying
commands and involved in major weapon systems procurement
programs. A list of the commands contacted is provided in
Appendix E.
A standard questionnaire was used for the interview.
The questions were in a survey format along the lines of the
DFAIR and other previous studies. This interview was more
structured than the one used for industry, so a more
quantitative approach could be used to evaluate the
responses. Comments were also solicited by the researcher
so a more complete picture of how policy is viewed and
applied by government procurement personnel could be
obtained. It is also the researcher's view that by using a
telephone interview a better response would be received than
by using a generically mailed survey sent to the major
buying commands.
The interview was structured around the following areas:
1. Determination of contractors' experience and average
dollar size of contracts worked with.
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2. Guidance obtained and understanding of DoD's Profit
Policy.
3. Application of profit policy in regards to FCE
investment and ability of WGL to incentivize capital
investment.
4. Perception of how profit policy is being applied.
5. Recommendations to better motivate capital investment.
The questions asked were not as open-ended as the ones
addressed to industry, however they still allowed for issues
and problems to be addressed and entered into the
discussion.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter provided an overview of the background and
development of the interviews and questions used to
accomplish this research.





One objective of this research was to assess the opinion
of both defense contractors and Government procurement
personnel on the ability of current DoD profit policy to
incentivize capital investment. This chapter presents the
data and responses collected from the interviews conducted.
Defense contractor responses will be addressed first.
B. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
Twenty-three of 2 5 defense contractors contacted agreed
to participate in this survey. Of the 23, two companies did
not answer all the questions. One provided a statement on
its position of profit policy. The other company's
divisions were so diverse (more commercial than military
oriented) that they believed they could not provide an
adequate response to the questionnaire. The remainder of
this section is divided into three subsections. These
subsections will address: (1) profit policy as an incentive
for capital investment, (2) the ongoing need for capital
investment and related decisions, and (3) profit and WGL
application.
29
1. Profit Policy as an Incentive
The first three questions asked the respondents
their view of DoD's Profit Policy as an incentive for making
capital investments.
Question 1. Does current DoD profit policy provide
adequate incentive for capital expenditures
on equipment and facilities?
Eighteen firms responded that profit policy was not
an adequate incentive. Four other firms stated it provided
indirect or little incentive for capital expenditures. A
majority of comments fell into the following categories:
1. Profit policy doesn't provide the necessary returns.
Motivation is an adequate ROI or internal rate of
return (IRR)
.
2. Competition and the need to remain cost competitive
was more of an incentive.
3. The company's financial health, cash flow and ability
to finance capital investments was the major
consideration for investment.
4. The greater the stability of a program the greater the
incentive was to invest.
The following comments were made by a smaller number of
respondents from the same group.
1. A majority of the company's defense business was
competitive in nature and therefore profit policy
played an insignificant role, if any in determining
capital investment decisions.
2. The declining DoD budget has created an atmosphere
where the pressure is to reduce capital expenditures
not increase them.
The contractors who responded that it provides
indirect incentive stated:
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1. Profit policy helps support a decision if all other
decision categories are equal.
2. Profit policy will only work as an effective incentive
if it is consistent and co-ordinated with other
acquisition policies.
Question 2. Is profit policy the appropriate tool for
incentivizing capital investment?
The majority of respondents stated that profit
policy is only one of a number of tools that should be used
to incentivize capital investment. Other ways to
incentivize were:
1. The need for greater program stability.
2. Multi-year contracting.
3. By providing an integrated financial package to
include progress payments, taxes, and reasonable cost
sharing.
4. To expand the limits of current policy and integrate
it with other programs such as the Industrial
Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP)
.
The few contractors who believed it was not an
appropriate tool made the following comments:
1. Specific programs and contracts were needed to
incentivize capital investment.
2. IMIP was a better tool for incentives. Unfortunately
it too had too many bureaucratic encumbrances and road
blocks to make it effective.
Question three was developed to determine if
companies had changed or adopted company policy to try to
benefit from current profit policy.
Question 3. Have there been any changes in company policy
to benefit from the higher values now applied
to facilities capital employed?
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All contractors responded that there had been no
change to policy. The opinions stated were:
1. Increases in FCE rates had made no changes in the
company's capital investment and budget planning.
2
.
That the current high rates of capital investment in
the company were not due to any changes in profit
policy.
3 Nobody in the company pays any attention to the
detailed formula in profit policy.
Only one company, highly dependent on defense
contracts, stated that while there had been no formal
changes, there may have been subtle changes in the outlook
of management concerned with evaluating and approving
requests for capital expenditures.
2 . Capital Investment Decisions
The next four questions address the industry's need
for capital investment, the factors involved in deciding
upon investment decisions and the differences if any between
defense and commercial segments.
Question 4. Are there opportunities or needs to make
investment decisions at this time?
All contractors stated the need for continued
capital investment. The requirements centered around the
company remaining a qualified and competitive contractor.
Companies were selective when making capital decisions
because of declining markets, limited funds for capital
investment, stability of DoD programs and ability to
successfully compete in new programs. When asked to rank
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capital expenditure criteria, new programs or developing
programs to expand new business, contractual requirements
for existing programs, and environmental requirements were
ranked above increased productivity (cost related) or
contract schedule risk reduction programs.
To address the factors or criteria used when making
capital expenditures on facilities and equipment the
following two questions were asked.
Question 5. For defense contracts, what criteria/factors
does your company consider prior to making
capital expenditures in facilities and
equipment?
Question 6. What differences, if any, are there in
capital investment decisions between defense
and commercial segments?
There was a wide range of answers to question number
five. Responses are divided into two areas, financial and
managerial analysis of capital expenditures.
The following tools were used in financial analysis:
1. Discounted cash flow analysis using either IRR or net
present value (NPV) criteria.
2. Overall ROA employed for a program.
3. Return on Investment measured against expected risk.
4
.
Some companies used expected pay back periods of two
to three years to examine capital expenditures.
The following factors were considered when making a
managerial analysis:
1. Program requirements, stability and risk.
2. Measurability of cost effectiveness of new equipment.
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3. Will additional investment make the company more
competitive.
4. Contract share arrangements and the potential for
increased profits due to lower cost performances.
5. Extent and availability of existing capital.
6. Does capital support existing and long term direction
of company.
There was little difference between criteria for
capital investment decisions between defense and commercial
segments. A large majority responded that corporate policy
made no distinction between capital investment decisions
between the two segments. The same financial as well as
managerial analysis was used. In a number of responses the
criteria of program stability and risk were considered to be
more negative a factor in defense programs. Also most
commercial and defense capital investments competed directly
against one another for the capital budget. Defense
programs that had lower returns and increased risk had a
greater probability of falling below the cut line in periods
of limited capital availability.
Question 7. How important is DoD Profit Policy as a
factor in deciding on expenditures on capital
investment?
Again all the contractors agreed that DoD Profit
Policy was not an important factor when deciding on
expenditures on capital equipment. More than 50 percent
responded that it was not considered at all. The remainder
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responded that it was not an important factor. Sample
responses included:
1. Profit policy is not considered as a deciding factor
in determining capital investment decision.
2. It has virtually no direct impact on the decision.
3. Profit Policy volatility reduces its influence in long
term decision making.
Though all agreed it was not a deciding factor a
minority held that profit policy did play a secondary
although an essential role, in that it does provide some
additional incentive. Other responses were that it could be
important in an overall sense if interrelated with contract
type and financing policy.
3 . Profit Policy and WGL Application
The final set of questions were directed at how
companies substantiate profit or fee objectives, their
opinions on how government procurement personnel apply
policy and any changes that can be made to modify policy.
Question 8. Does your company use DoD's weighted
guidelines to substantiate your profit/fee
objectives on negotiated contracts? If not,
what determines negotiated profit/fee levels?
All companies responded that they use WGL as a tool
to substantiate or confirm their profit/fee objectives on
negotiated contracts. Minimum and maximum ranges were
calculated so they had an idea of the profit range available
during negotiations. It also helped to identify Government
negotiators that were attempting to negotiate a profit/fee
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level below what the policy recommends. The respondents
stated that the primary consideration was subjective; what
price it will take to win the award. When spare parts or
follow-on awards were negotiated, company policy and market
expectations of profitability were more of a consideration.
When attempting to increase or justify profit/fee
levels, companies used technical, cost, and schedule risk
factors to substantiate their requirements. Past
performance and capital investment were also used.
Question 9. How can profit policy, in particular the
weighted guidelines, be changed/modified to
provide an incentive for investing in capital
facilities and equipment?
The responses to this question were varied. The
number of responses recommending a change or abandonment of
the policy exceeded the responses on requiring little if any
change. The responses centered around change are:
1. Adjust total profit levels so ROA is sufficient to
merit continued investment.
2. Change the base for determining FCE for the specific
contract and increase its weight.
3. Change FCE from labor hours association to one more
related to equipment/facility usage.
4. FCE ranges need to be increased. An incentive for
acquiring land for new facilities should be added.
5. Increase all ranges, current policy hasn't produced
results intended.
Responses that dealt with total revision of policy
include:
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1. A more direct link with other financing requirements
such as progress payments, cost sharing, tax
incentives and contract financing is needed.
2
.
No amount of tinkering with WGL by changing the
importance of the different elements will have any
effect on capital investment without changing the
total amount of profit markup.
3. Profit policy has evolved into an overly-detailed
numbers game with no view toward the "big picture."
4 New programs are not yielding adequate rates of return
for industry to meet their cost of capital.
The minority of responses that felt current policy
was an adequate process commented:
1. Profit policy does not need to change. There needs to
be a greater consistency among financing policies so
one does not take away the incentive the other
provides.
2. Implementation is inconsistent among the Services and
contracting officers.
Question 10. In your opinion, are Government negotiators
applying the weighted guidelines factors to
facilities capital employed in accordance
with DoD profit policy?
Of the respondents 41 percent believed policy was
being applied correctly, 27 percent disagreed, 23 percent
stated application was inconsistent and nine percent did not
know. The respondents who agreed indicated that Government
negotiators were making an honest effort to work within the
policy. However they felt that most did not go beyond the
averages as used in the policy.
The negative comments received were:
1. WGL were an after-the-fact exercise done after price
had been negotiated.
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2. Profit/ fee levels started with in negotiations were
arbitrary. Contracting officers were trying to
negotiate the lowest profit/fee possible.
3. Negotiators used preconceived limits such as past
history on treasury rates and would not go above but
would go below them.
The respondents who perceived inconsistent use of
policy commented:
1. WGL were used when only a lower profit level was
dictated. WGL requiring a higher profit level were
often not used.
2. There is no consistent application of DoD policy
across the military Services and their commands with
which we do business.
The last question in the survey was used as a recap
to help repeat the major influences that go into capital
investment decisions.
Question 11. Has DoD's decision to emphasize investment
in facilities capital employed influenced
your company's decision to invest in capital
facilities and equipment?
Twenty companies responded no and listed the same
responses to question three. These comments were:
1. FCE was not an incentive.
2. The company will invest only when adequate returns can
be demonstrated.
3. Competition and the need to invest to survive drove
investment.
4. The company will invest for the facilities and
equipment to do the job.
The minority responded:
1. Increased emphasis made capital investment more
attractive, however the benefits are offset by lower
progress payment rates and increased cost sharing.
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2. Yes there had been an influence but not from a profit
policy angle. The CAS cost of money factor has
produced an increase in contract revenue and is
helping to provide the cash to invest.
C. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT PERSONNEL
Data were collected by interviewing 50 Government
procurement personnel by telephone. The personnel
interviewed were selected from various major buying commands
representing the different Services. This provided
responses from a cross section of the Services buying
community. The purpose of these interviews was to gather
information representing procurement personnel perspective
of profit policy and how it is applied in negotiated awards.
Demographic data will be presented first. Comments or
observations listed in the profit policy subsection have
been consolidated by the researcher.
1 . Demographic Data
The first question aided the researcher in
identifying those personnel who participated in the survey.
The breakdown is shown in Table 3
.
Questions two and three were used to get a better
breakdown of the personnel interviewed in terms of years
experience in defense contracting and average dollar size
contracts handled. Table 4 provides a summary of the
experience level while Table 5 provides a breakout of the
average dollar value of contracts handled.
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TABLE 3





Source: All tables were developed by the researcher
unless otherwise noted.
TABLE 4








AVERAGE DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS
Avg Dollar Value Cont. Number
Less than 1 Million 2
1 to 25 million 5
26 to 50 million 11
51 to 100 million 6
Over 100 million 26
Total 50
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2 . Profit Policy Statements and Questions
Statement 4. Guidance on the use and application of DoD
Profit is clear and understandable.
Figure 1 is a distribution of responses for
statement four.
SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; NSO = No Strong Opinion; DA
disagree; SDA = Strongly Disagree.
Figure 1. Statement 4 Responses
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When asked to state their agreement or disagreement
on whether or not policy guidance is clear and
understandable, a majority (70 percent) agreed with the
statement. Only 18 percent felt that the policy was not
clear while 12 percent had no strong opinion. The
statements made by respondents in the majority indicated
that the guidance allowed for flexibility and judgment.
Interviewees who disagreed responded that:
1. There was room for clarification especially in FCE
guidelines.
2. Intent and mechanics were good; however reasoning
behind the instructions was not understandable.
3. Guidance was too general.
Statement 5. Contracting Officers have a good
understanding of how to apply the weighted
guidelines.
Figure 2 is a distribution of the responses to
statement five.
A majority of respondents (70 percent) agreed with
the statement. The few responses received indicated that
there was still some misunderstanding of when to apply and
how to apply the guidelines but in general most felt
comfortable with their understanding of how to apply WGL.
Of the 18 percent who disagreed and 12 percent who stated no
strong opinion, one response was common to both groups. It
was that contracting officers had become too reliant and in
some cases abdicated their responsibility or had became too
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Figure 2. Statement 5 Responses
Statement 6. Contracting Officers have adeguate
information available to justify higher or
lower rates when determining the weighted
guidelines facilities capital employed
factors.
Figure 3 is a distribution of the responses to
statement six.
A majority (58 percent) of the respondents agreed
that adequate information was available for decisions on FCE








Figure 3 . Statement 6 Responses
1. Information received was mostly from Defense Contract
Administration Service (DCAS) or Service Plant
Representative Office (PRO) organizations.
Contractors also provided information.
2. Information is available if the Contracting Officer is
willing to take the time to gather it.
The percentage that disagreed (30 percent) had the
following responses:
1. Information on what was going on in a facility was not
always available.
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2. There was no way to measure effectiveness or make
comparisons when deciding on whether to assign a
higher than average weight.
3. The information on smaller contractors was not always
available.
4. Contracting officers have too large a workload to
adequately research information.
When respondents were asked how often they justified
using other than average factors in FCE the majority who
responded stated they very rarely if ever give more than the
normal rate.
Statement 7. The weighted guidelines factors for
facilities capital employed are sufficient
in providing an incentive for capital
investment.
Figure 4 is a distribution of the responses from
statement seven.
In response to statement seven, 4 percent of the
respondents had no strong opinion. A larger percentage (34
percent) of respondents disagreed that WGL factors for FCE
are sufficient incentive for capital investment than agreed
(26 percent) . The respondents who disagreed stated:
1. FCE factors are not comprehensive. There needs to be
more of a direct link to productivity.
2. Factors had no effect on contractor capital
improvements. Contracting Officers doubted if
contractors even used it.
Statement 8. Profit policy is an appropriate tool for
incentivizing capital investment in more
productive facilities and equipment.
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Figure 4 . Statement 7 Responses
Figure 5 is the distribution of responses from
statement eight.
Responses to this statement were fairly evenly
split. The percentage that agreed (40 percent) responded
that the WGL are one of the tools available for incentiviz'
ing capital investment. Those who disagreed (36 percent)
responded the WGL were not working as intended. Other
responses included:
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Figure 5. Statement 8 Responses
1. WGL do not provide enough incentive.
2. WGL are not considered. Contractors have a minimum
ROA, ROI, that they want to receive.
A common response between those who did agree and those with
no strong opinion (24 percent) were that WGL were a valuable
tool but not the primary factor or incentive used for
capital investment.
Statement 9. There is pressure on the Contracting Officer
to keep profit down.
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Figure 6 is a distribution of the responses to
statement nine.
Figure 6. Statement 9 Responses
The majority of respondents (68 percent) agreed with
this statement. They cited the initial one percent
reduction in profit goal when the policy was started and
that both the WGL formula and management pressure within the
organization were to keep profit down. The percentage that
48
disagreed (32 percent) responded that each requirement was
looked at individually and a fair and reasonable profit was
given. Respondents who did disagree commented that
management did have an upper limit to profit and when WGL
profit/fee went above it, a greater degree of justification
was required.
Statement 10. The profit/fee objective is more often
determined on past averages or history than
on weighted guidelines objectives.


















Figure 7. Statement 10 Responses
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In response to this question half (50 percent)
agreed that profit/ fee objectives were often determined by
historical rates. This was especially true for reprocure-
ments where expectations of what was given on the last
contract became the target for the next contract.
Contracting Officers, given a scenario of a contractor who
makes a capital investment in facilities and equipment and
reduces costs, when given a WGL computation for a higher
profit still maintained that the historical average would be
the negotiation position. Another common response was to
adjust the WGL factors to match what the historical profit
level was. The respondents who disagreed (48 percent)
stated that they did consider history, but only as one of
the factors. The WGL were used along with personal
judgement and the need to provide a fair and reasonable
profit.
Statement 11. Profit/fee determinations are often made
before weighted guidelines computations.
Figure 8 is a distribution of the responses to
statement 11.
In response to statement 11, 70% disagreed that the
profit/fee determination was made before WGL computation.
Some of the responses were:
1. Contracting Officers were more accountable for doing
WGL computations before negotiations.
2
.









Figure 8. Statement 11 Responses
The 24 percent who agreed stated that:
1. Negotiators usually have a "gut" feel based on
perceived risk of the program.
2. They hope the WGL will support what they believe is
fair and reasonable.
3. The WGL were used to back into already perceived
judgment of what profit should be.
When asked how defense contractors justified their
profit/fee level, Government procurement personnel had a
common response. Defense contractors would use degree of
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risk, historical rates, and past performance to justify
negotiated profit/fee levels. WGL were rarely if ever used.
Statement 12. Current profit policy emphasis on
facilities capital employed has resulted in
increased capital investment.
12.








Figure 9. Statement 12 Responses
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The majority (56 percent) had no strong opinion on
this statement. The respondents believed they didn't have
enough information to answer the statement. Those who
disagreed (34 percent) stated they have not observed any
increases in capital investment. They also stated that FCE
was not an incentive or not enough of one to fuel capital
expenditures
.
Question 13. Have you noticed a change in a contractor's
capital expenditures because of the
productivity rewards in DoD's profit policy?
Why or why not?
The majority (76 percent) of the respondents stated
they had not noticed any change in a contractor's capital
expenditures due to DoD's Profit Policy. The respondents
stated:
1. Profit policy does not have enough impact to
incentivize capital investment.
2. No correlation. Companies are investing to stay
competitive or buying what is required to produce the
product.
3. No change. Contractors don't believe it's a long term
issue and are not about to make any capital
investments because of it.
4. Increases in facilities do not equate to reduced
costs.
5. No. Contractors don't believe they are going to reap
savings if more productive equipment is used.
The respondents (8 percent) who had noticed capital
expenditures stated that it was on a limited scale. They
could only identify one, possibly two, companies that they
had worked with that might have taken advantage of the new
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rates. They then commented that they felt it was the
exception rather than the rule.
Question 14 requested comments and recommendations
on how to improve profit policy. The respondents who
commented recommended:
1. A more direct link between more productive facilities
and equipment is required. The IMIP and Manufacturinq
Technoloqy (MANTECH) proqrams were mentioned as
examples.
2. The use of incentives and award fees built into
contracts to motivate contractors to look at
productivity and cost reduction.
3. Measurinq new investment vice current FCE. Make the
award or fee directly proportional to investment and
productivity.
4. That profit policy, financinq and increasinq
productivity have to be better related.
D. SUMMARY
Data obtained durinq the researcher's interviews were
presented in two sections, Defense Contractor interviews and
Government Procurement Personnel interviews. The followinq




This chapter provides a managerial analysis of the data
presented in Chapter IV. The analysis is conducted by
grouping the data from one or more sources as it pertains to
the individual research questions and issues.
While the analysis is developed around individual
research questions and issues, it is important to remember
that the overall objective of this study is to assess the
ability of DoD's Profit Policy to incentivize defense
contractors to make capital investment in more productive
facilities and equipment. The analysis of the individual
research questions and issues are brought together in the
Findings and Conclusion section of Chapter VI.
B. INCENTIVIZING CAPITAL INVESTMENT
The purpose of this section is to determine if profit
policy has acted as an incentive for capital investment in
the defense industry.
A review of the literature indicates that the Government
has attempted to incentivize capital investment by use of
the WGL in profit policy. Section 215. 970-1 (c) in the
DFARS, on Facilities Capital Employed, states:
The intent of this profit factor is to encourage and
reward aggressive capital investment in facilities that
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benefit DoD. This factor recognizes both the facilities
capital to be employed by the contractor in the
performance of the contract and the contractor's
commitment to improving productivity. . .
.
DoD has attempted to promote capital investment for more
productive facilities and equipment through this policy.
Nevertheless defense contractors interviewed do not
consider current policy as an adequate incentive for making
capital investments. Seventy-five percent responded that it
provided inadequate or no incentive. An analysis of this
indicated that profit policy alone does not provide the
returns required to encourage capital investment. More
important factors included a contractor's ability to invest,
program stability, other uses for the capital to be employed
and return on the risk taken.
Competitive pressure was another important factor. The
emphasis on competition has limited the use of profit policy
on negotiated contracts. Profit policy and its FCE
incentive had little if any impact in companies with small
defense segments or companies that dealt mainly with
competitive awards. Companies were also incentivized to
make capital investments for competitive cost reduction and
competitive advantage aimed at the defense of current market
share or as a strategy for market capture.
Companies whose defense work was primarily research and
development or service oriented received little benefit from
current policy. The alternate method used to determine
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profit and the lack of capital equipment used provides
little if any incentive for capital investment.
Profit policy was considered an appropriate tool to
incentivize capital investment. Defense contractors also
stated it was only one of a number of ways to incentivize
investment, and a small one at that. The researcher
observed that more important incentives included the
financial health of the company, multi-year contracting,
program stability and cash flow. It becomes even more of a
tool in well thought through programs when there is long
term commitment and procurement in economic order
quantities. Companies can then make the long range plans
needed to provide for better production capability. There
was also considerable agreement that profit policy could
become a better incentive if integrated with other financial
tools such as progress payments, taxes incentives and
reasonable cost sharing. This concept was also bought out
in a study done by the MAC Group. It states: [Ref. 12: p.
43]
If profit adjustments are insufficient to encourage
capital market investment in the industry, the DoD will
have to consider other solutions, including increasing the
level of progress payments or restoring tax deferrals.
Any changes in policy to benefit from the new FCE
factors would be an indicator that the policy was providing
an incentive. In this respect contractors were in unanimous
agreement. There has been no change to company policy to
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benefit from changes in FCE factors. The inability of
profit policy to provide an adequate return along with
program instability, constant changes in the policy and
inconsistent application of the policy severely degrades its
ability to act as an incentive for a company to change its
long term capital budgeting plans.
When asked how profit policy, in particular WGL, could
be changed to provide an incentive a majority of contractors
responded that a mechanism or adjustment of all the factors
was needed so a better rate of return was assured. Again
the analysis indicated a more direct link to other financing
and tax incentives could help provide a stable environment
conducive to capital investment.
There was also a strong response for total revision of
the policy. The responses indicated that problems with
inconsistent application and an emphasis on formulas and not
individual requirements, or big picture thinking, kept
current profit policy from being effective.
Government contracting officers were also asked to
respond to statements on the ability of profit policy to act
as an incentive for capital investment. Table 6 breaks out
responses on this issue.
When analyzed as a single group a plurality (40 percent)
had no strong opinion. A larger percentage (34 percent)
disagreed that it was not a sufficient incentive than those
who believed it was (26 percent) . When broken down by
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TABLE 6





All (50) 26% 40% 34%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 27% 50% 23%
11-33 (28) 25% 32% 43%
Contract Value
Less than 100 M (25) 28% 40% 32%
More than 100 M (25) 24% 40% 36%
groups all but one group follow the trend of the overall
interview. Government procurement officers with greater
than ten years of defense contracting experience had a
stronger disagreement on the ability of profit policy to
provide an adequate incentive for capital investment. Their
stronger disagreement is not a surprise. This group has
participated in the different attempts by DoD to incentivize
capital investment and are aware of the inability of
previous profit policies to achieve this objective.
In view of the attempts DoD has made to use profit
policy to incentivize capital investment the researcher
asked whether it was an appropriate tool to use to
incentivize capital investment. Table 7 analyzes the
response to this statement.
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TABLE 7
PROFIT POLICY IS AN APPROPRIATE TOOL FOR INCENTIVIZING
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
No
Responses N Agree Strong Opinion Disagree
All (50) 40% 24% 36%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 41% 27% 32%
11-33 (28) 40% 21% 39%
Contract Value
Less than 100 M (25) 28% 28% 44%
More than 100 M (25) 52% 20% 28%
When segregating the data by contract value the high
value contract group responded differently than the
population as a whole. A majority (52 percent) who handle
contracts over 100 million dollars agree that it's an
appropriate incentive. The contracting officers who handle
contracts of less than 100 million (28 percent) agreed less
than the overall group. The researcher's analysis would
indicate that defense contractors with higher value
contracts would have a greater profit due to the FCE factor
applied. Smaller contractors would not have that factor and
therefore not provide the additional incentive. Government
procurement personnel also responded that the concept of
motivating capital investment in facilities that benefit DoD
was appropriate, however they were unsure of its
effectiveness. An analysis indicated that they were unable
to establish a link between increased capital investment and
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profit policy and in particular the factors applied to FCE.
Government procurement personnel considered WGL a valuable
tool. It provides a structured approach based on risk and
capital employed that can be applied effectively on most
contracts they administer.
Another way to evaluate profit policy as an incentive
was to ask contracting officers if they have seen or
evaluated an increase in capital investment due to the
increased emphasis on FCE. Table 8 analyzes the responses
to this issue.
TABLE 8
EMPHASIS ON FCE HAS RESULTED IN INCREASED
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
No
Responses N Agree Strong Opinion Disagree
All (50) 10% 56% 34%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 18% 55% 27%
11-33 (28) 4% 57% 39%
Contract Value
Less than 100 M (25) 8% 60% 32%
More than 100 M (25) 12% 52% 36%
The majority in all groups had no strong opinion on this
statement. In comments received, Government procurement
personnel stated they did not have enough information to
answer the question. The disparity in agreement is evident
in the group with defense experience. There was far less
61
agreement (4 percent) of personnel with greater than ten
years experience then those with less than ten years (18
percent)
.
Finally when asked if they could correlate an increase
in capital investment in more productive facilities and
equipment an overwhelming majority (76 percent) responded
no.
In the researcher's view capital investment is a
function of a number of variables including contract award,
return on investment, program stability and cash flow.
Profit policy only provides a small incentive, the ability
to provide an additional fee. However, when compared to the
other factors it does not provide the incentive needed to
provide for investment in more productive facilities and
equipment.
C. CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING
The purpose of this section is to determine how
important or what roles profit policy plays when making
capital investment decisions.
The majority of contractors didn't believe profit policy
played much, if any role in the decision making process. In
responses to questions in the interview, on how important is
DoD profit policy as a factor in deciding on capital
equipment expenditures, more then 50 percent responded it
was not considered at all. In fact, the main comment
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received was that profit policy had virtually no direct
impact on capital budget decisions. Contractors responded
that a reason for this was the continuing change of DoD
policies reduced any influence it might have in their
company's long term budget process. Contractors responded
again that profit policy could play a larger part in the
process if better integrated with other financial policies.
Question 11 was asked to provide additional information
on the importance of profit policy in capital investment
decisions. If a company's decision to invest had been
influenced by profit policy then, in the researcher's
opinion, it would have some importance in the decision
making process. Twenty of 22 contractors responded that
profit policy had not influenced any decision to invest in
capital facilities or equipment. The majority of the
response generated from this question were similar to
question one. The analysis indicated that the FCE factor
was not considered enough of an incentive to base investment
decisions on, and that a company will invest only when
adequate returns can be demonstrated. It also indicated
that there was an underlying belief that the increased
emphasis had or could make capital investment more
attractive. However, any benefits derived from the current
policy were more than offset by other policies and tax laws.
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D. FACTORS AFFECTING CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS
The purpose of this section is to determine what factors
other than profit policy were used when making capital
investment decisions.
Before determining what factors are used in capital
investment decision making, the need or opportunities for
capital investment was addressed. Contractors responded
that they are always looking for and have the need to make
capital investments. This need centered around new product
generation, remaining competitive and being in compliance
with current laws and regulations.
The criteria or factors used by defense contractors can
be divided into two areas, financial analysis, and
managerial analysis of capital expenditures. In the
interviews conducted, contractors noted there was little
difference in the evaluation of defense segment and
commercial segment investments. All used a form of cash
flow analysis such as IRR or NPV. Other financial factors
such as ROA and ROI were also used.
In a managerial analysis program stability and risk were
most often mentioned. Other concerns included cost
effectiveness of new equipment, extent and availability of
capital and the ability of the investment to make the
company more competitive.
Capital investment criteria were also based on the type
of investment the company needed to pursue. New or
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developing programs were placed high on the capital budget.
Contractual reguirements for existing programs and the needs
for investment in environmental or safety reguirements were
next. If there was a statutory requirement for health or
safety investments then these would come first on the
capital budget. Investments for cost reduction on existing
programs was close to the bottom of the capital budget. An
analysis of this indicates that any cost savings will be
recouped by the Government at the next contract award and
not kept by the contractor as in a commercial venture.
Along with this cost reduction the contractor also receives
a decline in profits. This event occurs when defense
contractors deal with Government procurement personnel who
base their negotiated profit levels on historical rates.
In the interviews the contractors often stated that
there was a hurdle rate or expected return the company
placed on capital expenditures based on the criteria in the
above paragraphs. The researcher observed that when new
programs were bid, the price that was submitted was based on
the company's managerial analysis of what it would take to
win the award. In the researcher's view this does place a
difference of criteria in the decision making policy. If
awards are bid and won that return less then the company's
required rate then any future capital investment other than
what is required to fulfill the program may not occur.
Productivity improvements in defense programs that have low
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returns are more likely to fall below the cut line in the
capital budget when compared to commercial programs with
greater rates of return.
E. PROFIT POLICY GUIDELINES
The purpose of this research area was to determine if
current policy guidelines are being followed by DoD
contracting personnel so that defense contractors can depend
upon increased profit if productivity enhancing capital
investments are made.
For any policy to be effective the people working with
the policy must have the guidance and the ability to apply
it. Responses to statements on guidance on the use and
application of DoD profit policy and contracting officers'




GUIDANCE ON THE USE AND APPLICATION OF DoD
PROFIT POLICY IS CLEAR AND UNDERSTANDABLE
Responses (N) Agree Strong Opinion Disagree
All (50) 70% 12% 18%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 73% 9% 18%
11-33 (28) 68% 14% 18%
Contract Value
less than 100 M (25) 80% 8% 12%
more than 100 M (25) 60% 16% 24%
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TABLE 10
CONTRACTING OFFICERS HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING




All (50) 70% 14% 16%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 73% 14% 13%
11-33 (28) 68% 14% 18%
Contract Value
less than 100 M (25) 76% 12% 12%
more than 100 M (25) 64% 16% 20%
An analysis of Table 9 data indicates that the majority
(70 percent) of personnel believe that the guidance on the
use and application is understandable. The contract value
group of over 100 million had the greatest disparity from
the overall population. An analysis of Table 10 data also
indicates that the majority of contracting officers have a
good understanding of how to apply the WGL. Again the
contract value group of over 100 million had the lowest
amount of agreement. A reason for this may be that in some
buying commands price analysts work-up and in some cases
negotiate price and profit for contracts valued at five
million dollars or more. This would effectively eliminate
some of the contracting officers from dealing with the
policy. Responses that contracting officers had become too
reliant on price analysts and in some cases abdicated their
responsibility to them support this view. On the whole, the
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structure was considered adequate and provided an approach
on how to arrive at a profit objective.
Contracting officers, to adequately apply FCE factors,
have to have adequate information when determining what
rates to apply. Table 11 provides an analyzes on the
adequacy of the information provided.
TABLE 11
ADEQUATE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO JUSTIFY
HIGHER OR LOWER RATES WHEN DETERMINING FCE FACTORS
No
Responses N Agree Strong Opinion Disagree
All (50) 58% 12% 30%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 68% 9% 23%
11-33 (28) 50% 14% 36%
Contract Value
Less than 100 M (25) 68% 12% 20%
More than 100 M (25) 48% 12% 40%
A majority of respondents (58 percent) agree that there
is enough information available to make the decision on the
appropriate factors to apply to FCE. When broken out into
years experience and contract value groups, the more
experienced personnel along with the larger value contracts
group still agreed but at a lower level then the overall
population and other groups. The majority of respondents
stated that they relied heavily on DCAA, DCAS or Service
PROs to provide them with the information needed for this
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decision. When asked how often they gave other than average
rates (15 percent facilities, 35 percent equipment)
contracting officers responded that very rarely were other
than normal rates used. An analysis of this indicates that
though they receive information from supporting activities
and contractors, Government procurement personnel had
difficulty in measuring the productivity effectiveness of
FCE. Time and the ability to do research into its
effectiveness were limited and kept the contracting officer
from getting all the information that was needed.
Government procurement personnel were asked to respond
to the statement that there is pressure to keep profits
down. Table 12 outlines the responses.
TABLE 12
THERE IS PRESSURE ON THE CONTRACTING OFFICERS
TO KEEP PROFITS DOWN
No
Responses N Agree Strong Opinion Disagree
All (50) 68% 0% 32%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 73% 0% 27%
11-33 (28) 64% 0% 36%
Contract Value
Less than 100 M (25) 68% 0% 32%
More than 100 M (25) 68% 0% 32%
As shown in Table 12, a majority (68 percent) of all
respondents agreed there was pressure to keep profits down
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This pressure was from management, the WGL and the
implementation of current policy when a one percent
reduction in profits was recommended. The responses in the
different categories also show a strong agreement to this
statement. There was, however, an underlying belief that
each requirement needed to be looked at individually and a
"fair and reasonable" profit be given.
For WGL to be effective they have to be used in the
determination of the profit/fee objective. Analysis of
Tables 13 and 14 indicate how well WGL are used to derive
the profit objective.
TABLE 13
THE PROFIT/FEE OBJECTIVE IS MORE OFTEN DETERMINED
ON HISTORY OR PAST AVERAGES THAN WGL
No
Responses N Agree Strong Opinion Disagree
All (50) 52% 2% 46%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 59% 5% 36%
11-33 (28) 46% 0% 54%
Contract Value
Less than 100 M (25) 56% 0% 44%
More than 100 M (25) 48% 4% 48%
The majority of the respondents agreed (52 percent) that
history or past averages more often determined the contract-
ing officer's initial position in negotiations. When broken
out by different groups the defense contractors with greater
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TABLE 14
THE PROFIT/FEE OBJECTIVE IS DETERMINED
BEFORE WGL COMPUTATION
No
Responses N Agree Strong Opinion Disagree
All (50) 24% 6% 70%
Years Exp.
2-10 (22) 32% 5% 63%
11-33 (28) 18% 7% 75%
Contract Value
Less than 100 M (25) 16% 8% 76%
More than 100 M (25) 32% 4% 64%
experience and higher value contract group do not use prior
history as much. An analysis of this indicates that
Government procurement officers with greater experience and
higher value contracts use history as only one of many
factors. Historical rates played a major role in
reprocurements. Analysis indicates that even if a
contractor was to become more productive through increased
capitalization negotiations for reprocurement would be
biased towards past averages or historical rates.
When Table 14 is analyzed the majority (70 percent)
disagreed that the actual profit/fee was determined before
WGL computations. When broken out into different groups
there was still strong disagreement, ranging from 63 percent
to 75 percent, on the determination of profit objectives
before WGL computations. The researcher found that
Government procurement personnel were using WGL to arrive at
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profit objectives. They, however, found it difficult to
remove themselves from using past averages or historical
profit rates. If the contracting officer was in a first
time negotiation then WGL played a major part in their
negotiations. Business judgement and the concept of "fair
and reasonable" were also used in determining the
profit/ fee.
An analysis of Tables 12, 13, and 14 indicates that a
substantial minority of Government procurement personnel are
using WGL to "back into" an expected profit level. This may
be due to perceived pressure to keep profit levels down, the
use of past history or the "gut feel" personnel have when
they determine prof it/ fee levels.
An analysis of the defense contractors 1 opinion on this
issue indicates that 41 percent believe Government
negotiators are complying with policy. Of the responses 27
percent disagreed while 23 percent felt application was
inconsistent. There was an overall opinion expressed by
contractors in all groups that government negotiators did
not move past the averages. This is consistent with the
remarks and analysis of Government procurement officers 1
responses. The perception that profit policy is not being
consistently applied or the belief that the company is not
getting anything other than the average factors when it
comes to FCE will keep companies from believing profit
policy is an incentive for capital investment.
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VI. FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this thesis was to examine DoD's profit
policy and its ability to incentivize defense contractors in
making capital investment in more productive facilities and
equipment. The principal findings and conclusions are from
the analysis conducted in the previous chapter. They are
presented by research question and provide the results of
the research.
1. Has Current DoD Profit Policy Been an Incentive for
Capital Investment in the Defense Industry?
Current profit policy has been ineffective in
incentivizing defense contractors to invest in more
productive facilities and equipment. Seventy-five percent
of the defense contractors responded that it provided
inadequate or no incentive. Competition, the company's
financial health, program stability and adequate return on
risks taken were more important factors. There was also
substantial disagreement from Government procurement
personnel on the ability of facilities capital employed to
act as an incentive. Finally, defense contractors were in
unanimous agreement that there had been no change in company
policy to try to benefit from the increased incentives on
FCE.
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In a related finding, both contractors and a
plurality (40 percent) of Government procurement personnel
supported the use of profit policy as an appropriate tool to
incentivize capital investment. Defense contractors stated
the need for a more comprehensive policy incorporating other
financial and tax incentives. Government procurement
personnel were more concerned with equating additional
profit to increased capitalization in more productive
facilities and equipment.
In and of itself profit policy provides insufficient
incentive for capital investment. Defense companies stated
that what little incentive it did supply was overshadowed by
other conflicting DoD and tax policies.
2 . How Important is DoD Policy in Capital Investment
Decision Making?
DoD Profit Policy is not an important factor when
deciding on the capital budget. Over 50 percent of the
defense contractors interviewed responded that it was not
considered at all during the capital budgeting process.
Even with the increased weights placed on FCE it was not
considered incentive enough to base investment decisions on.
Ninety-one percent of the contractors responded that profit
policy had not influenced any decision to invest in capital
facilities or equipment.
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3. What Factors Other Than DoD Profit Policy Affect the
Defense Industries Capital Investment Decision?
There is no single answer to this question. Each
company used different factors and decision making tools to
develop their capital budget. Companies generally analyze
two areas: financial and managerial. Financial analysis
provided expected rates of return while managerial provided
program evaluation and risk assessments.
In companies with both defense and commercial
segments the capital investments for both were evaluated by
the same criteria or factors. Productivity improvements
usually fell below other capital investment needs such as
new programs, environmental and health investments and newly
awarded program requirements. In companies with a large
degree of commercial work, defense segment productivity
improvements ended up low on the capital budgeting list.
Low returns and high risk factors put these segments at a
disadvantage when competing against commercial requirements.
4
.
Are Current Policy Guidelines Being Followed by DoD
Contracting Officers So That Contractors Can Depend
Upon Increased Profit if They Make Capital
Expenditures?
DoD Profit Policy is not being followed as
originally intended. A majority (70 percent) of Government
personnel responded that WGL are computed before profit/fee
determination. However, 52 percent agreed when responding
to a different statement that the prof it/ fee objective is
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more often determined by past history. The WGL were then
being used to "back-in" to a profit/ fee objective.
In a related finding Government procurement
personnel perceived pressure to keep profit/fee levels low.
This pressure was three fold. It came from management, the
WGL when profit levels were perceived as too low and the
recommendation to reduce profit levels by one percent when
the present policy was implemented.
A contributing factor to policy ineffectiveness was
the indirect link between increased FCE factors and more
productive facilities and eguipment. Government procurement
personnel rarely used other than average rates and were
reluctant to use higher factors because they were unable to
associate it with increased productivity.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Three recommendations are offered for resolving the
issues identified in the research. The second and third
recommendations are similar to the ones made in Reference 4
and are still valid today.
1. The DoD should encourage the use of more direct
incentives for capital investment. If it is DoD's
intent to incentivize capital investment then a more
direct approach needs to be initiated. A more
widespread use of already existing programs such as
IMIP or MANTECH can be initiated. Greater use of
incentive or award fee contracts can be used or
adapted to provide the direct link between
productivity and the fee awarded.
2
.
The DoD should give more attention to the proper
implementation of profit policy. This can be done by
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making the major buying commands and procurement
personnel more accountable in explaining how profit
objectives are arrived at. Monitoring of DD form 1547
may also provide an insight on how profit policy is
being implemented.
The DoD should review and restate the objectives of
profit policy to the Services and procurement
personnel. Personnel need to have a clear
understanding of what is expected and required. If
the objective is to just eliminate disincentives to
capital investment then it should also be realized




CURRENT POD PROFIT POLICY
The following is an excerpt from the DoD Federal




PART 215—CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION
SUBPART 215.9—PROFIT
215.900 Scope of Subpart. This subpart prescribes
additional policies and procedures which DoD contracting
officers shall use in developing a prenegotiation profit or
fee objective (hereafter collectively called "profit
objective") on negotiated defense contracts.
215.902 Policy.
(a) (1) (i) The Weighted Guidelines Method described in
215.970 is DoD's structured approach for performing a profit
analysis on contract actions where price is to be
negotiated. Its purpose is to provide a uniform and
consistent manner for rewarding risk, motivating efficient
and quality performance, and stimulating capital investment
in the defense industrial base. The contracting officer
shall use the Weighted Guidelines Method, or an alternate
structured approach as authorized in 215. 902 (a) (1) (ii) , for
any negotiated contract action that requires cost analysis
(FAR 15.805-3). A profit analysis shall not be performed on
contract actions to be awarded on the basis of adequate
price competition (FAR 15. 804-3 (b) ) . Furthermore, practices
which produce an arbitrary profit objective or accomplish a
profit analysis on an after-the-fact basis are unacceptable.
(ii) The contracting officer may use an alternate
structured approach, described in 215.971, in lieu of the
Weighted Guidelines Method for the types of contract actions
listed immediately below. The alternate structured approach
must specifically address performance risk, contract type
risk (including contractor working capital) , and contractor
facilities capital.
(A) Contract actions under $500,000;
(B) Architect-engineer contracts;
(C) Construction contracts;
(D) Contracts primarily requiring delivery of material
supplied by subcontractors;
(E) Termination settlements; and
(F) Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
(iii) Although it is intended that the Weighted
Guidelines Method be applied to most negotiated contract
actions, there may be unusual situations where this method
may not produce a reasonable overall profit objective. An
alternate structured approach may be used by the contracting
officer, provided that approval has been obtained in writing
from the head of the contracting activity. This approval
authority may be redelegated in accordance with Departmental
procedures.
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(iv) The contracting officer shall use the modified
Weighted Guidelines Method for contract actions with
nonprofit organizations (see 215.972).
(S-70) If the contract action involves a modification
to an existing contract, the contracting officer may apply
the profit rate in the existing contract to the modification
if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) Modification is a relatively small dollar amount;
(2) Work to be performed under the modification is
similar to that required in the existing contract; and
(3) Other relevant variables have not materially
changed (e.g., performance risk, interest rates, progress
payment rates, distribution of facilities capital)
.
(S-71) The Weighted Guidelines Method shall be used to
establish a basic profit rate under a formula type pricing
agreement, and this basic rate may be used on all contract
actions issued under that agreement, provided that
conditions affecting profit do not change materially.
(S-72) The prime contractor should be encouraged to use
the Weighted Guidelines Method or a similar structured
approach in developing profit objectives for negotiated
subcontracts
.
215.903 Contracting Officer Responsibilities.
(b) The Weighted Guidelines Method of profit analysis
shall not be used in instances where cost analysis is being
performed to assess cost realism on competitive
acquisitions.
(e) The contractor should be encouraged to present the
details of proposed profit amounts in the format described
in 215.970, if application of the Weighted Guidelines Method
is anticipated. This will facilitate a more complete
discussion of the individual factors which will determine
the overall profit objective. Specific agreement on the
applied weights or values for individual profit factors
shall not be attempted.
(S-70) The contracting officer's price negotiation
memorandum shall fully document the profit analysis
performed, whether it be accomplished through the Weighted
Guidelines Method or an alternate structured approach.
(S-71) The contracting officer is responsible for the
accuracy and timeliness of profit reporting under DoD's
management information system (see 204.673). Such reporting
should be accomplished within 30 calendar days after the
date of contract award. The contracting officer is




215.905-1 Common Factors. It is not necessary for the
contracting officer to give consideration to the common
factors beyond the means included in the Weighted Guidelines
Method and alternate structured approaches.
215.970 Weighted Guidelines Method. The Weighted
Guidelines Method requires application of a DD Form 1547,
"Record of Weighted Guidelines Method Application" (see
253 .303-70-DD-1547) . This method is DoD's structured
approach for (a) performing the profit analysis necessary to
develop a prenegotiation objective, (b) summarizing profit
amounts subsequently negotiated as part of the contract
price, and (c) serving as the principal source document for
reporting profit statistics through DoD's management
information system. The Weighted Guidelines Method
expressly takes into account the contractor's degree of
performance risk in producing the goods or services being
acquired, the contract type risk assumed by the contractor
under varied contract and incentive arrangements, and the
nature and extent of facilities capital to be employed by
the contractor. A normal value and designated range have
been established for each profit factor. The normal value
is the expected profit assignment where average conditions
exist when compared to all goods and services acquired by
DoD. The contracting officer may assign any value within
the designated range if conditions warrant.
215.970-1 Procedures for Establishing a Profit Objective.
(a) Performance Risk . This profit factor addresses the
contractor's risk in fulfilling the contractual requirements
to provide the supplies or to perform the services being
acquired.
(1) Profit Base . The profit amount for performance
risk is computed by multiplying a composite profit value
assigned by the contracting officer times total contract
costs, excluding general and administrative (G&A) expenses,
contractor independent research and development/bid and
proposal (IR&D/B&P) expenses, and facilities capital cost of
money.
(2) Normal Values and Designated Ranges .
(i) Standard . Except for limited cases as provided in
215. 970-1 (a) (2) (ii) , the normal value and designated range
for the performance risk profit factor are as shown below.




Performance Risk (Standard) 4% 2% to 6%
81
(ii) Alternate . It is DoD's intent to base a
substantive portion of total profit on contractor investment
in facilities capital. However, some research and
development and service contractors require relatively low
capital investment in buildings and equipment when compared
to the defense industry overall. For such contractors, the
contracting officer may use the alternate normal value and
designated range shown below. If the alternate is used, the
contractor may not be given any profit for facilities




6% 4% to 8%Performance Risk (Alternate)
(3) Evaluation Criteria . Performance risk shall be
evaluated using three criteria: technical, management and
cost control. Each is an integral part of developing the
composite profit value for performance risk. The
contracting officer shall weight each criterion as judged
appropriate for the supplies or services being acquired. The
profit value assigned will vary according to the
contractor's performance risk in providing the supplies or
services required by the contract. While any value may be
assigned within the designated range, it is expected that
the maximum and minimum values will be restricted to cases
where performance risk is substantially above or below
normal. The following example demonstrates how a composite
profit value for performance risk is calculated.
Weight Value Weighted
Assigned Assigned Value
Technical 30% 5.0% 1.5%
Management 30 4.0 1.2
Cost Control 40 4.5 1.
8
Composite Value 4.5
(i) Technical . This criterion focuses on the technical
risk associated with providing the goods and services being
acquired. The contracting officer's evaluation should
address such factors as the technology being applied or
developed by the contractor, technical complexity, program
maturity, performance specifications and tolerances, and
delivery schedule. The contracting officer is expected to
carefully review the contract requirements and focus on the
critical performance elements in the statement of work or
specifications. The extent of a warranty or guarantee
coverage should also be considered. Conditions which might
justify higher or lower values are discussed below.
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(A) Above Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a higher than normal value in those cases where
there is substantial technical risk. The following are
indicators that such a condition may exist: the contractor
is either developing or applying advanced technologies;
items are being manufactured using specifications with
stringent tolerance limits; the efforts require highly
skilled personnel or require the use of state of the art
machinery; the services and analytical efforts are of utmost
importance to the Government and must be performed to
exacting standards; the contractor's independent development
and investment has reduced the Government's risk or cost;
the contractor has accepted an accelerated delivery schedule
to meet DoD requirements ; the contractor has assumed
additional risk through warranty provisions. A maximum
value may be Justified in the development or initial
production of a new item, particularly if performance or
quality specifications are tight, or if there is a high
degree of development or production concurrency. Extremely
complex, vital efforts to overcome difficult technical
obstacles which require personnel with exceptional
abilities, experience and professional credentials may also
justify a value significantly above normal.
(B) Below Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a lower than normal value in those cases where
the technical risk is low. The following are indicators
that such a condition may exist: off the shelf items are
being acquired; relatively simple requirements are
specified; there is little application of complex
technology; efforts that do not require highly skilled
personnel or which are relatively routine; mature programs;
follow-on efforts and repetitive type procurements. A
profit value significantly below normal may be justified for
circumstances such as the following: routine services;
production of simple items; rote entry or routine
integration of government furnished information; simple
operations within government owned facilities.
(ii) Management . This criterion considers the management
effort involved on the part of the contractor to integrate
the resources necessary to meet contract requirements.
Resources include raw materials, labor, technology,
information, and capital. The contracting officer should
assess the contractor's management and internal control
systems as well as the management involvement expected on
the individual contract action. The contracting Officer
should consider the degree of cost mix as an indication of
the types of resources applied and value-added by the
contractor. The cost elements should not, themselves, be a
basis for profit assignment. In evaluating management
efforts, the contracting officer should use reviews made by
the field contract administration office or other pertinent
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DoD field offices. The contracting officer should also give
consideration to the contractor's support of federal
socioeconomic programs, such as small business concerns,
small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, handicapped
sheltered workshops, labor surplus areas, and energy
conservation. Conditions which might justify higher and
lower values are discussed below.
(A) Above Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a higher than normal value in those cases where
the management effort is intense. The following are
indicators that such a condition may exist: the value-added
by the contractor is both considerable and reasonably
difficult; the effort involves a high degree of integration
or coordination; the contractor has a substantial record of
active participation in federal socioeconomic programs. A
maximum value for management may be justified under
conditions such as the following: efforts requiring large
scale integration of the most complex nature; major
international activities requiring significant management
coordination; or efforts with management milestones of
critical importance.
(B) Below Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a lower than normal value in those cases where
the management effort is minimal. The following are
indicators that such a condition may exist: a mature
program where many end item deliveries have been made; the
contractor adds minimum value to an item; routine efforts
which require minimal supervision; the contractor provides
poor quality, untimely proposals; the contractor fails to
provide an adequate analysis of subcontractor costs; the
contractor does not cooperate in the evaluation and
negotiation of the proposal. A significantly below normal
profit value may be justified if reviews performed by the
field contract administration offices disclose
unsatisfactory management and internal control systems
(e.g., quality assurance, property control, safety,
security) or if the effort requires an unusually low degree
of management involvement.
(iii) Cost Control . This criterion focuses on the
contractor's efforts to reduce and control costs. The
principal areas for evaluation are the expected reliability
of cost estimates, cost reduction initiatives, and cost
control management. Other factors which bear on the
contractor's ability to meet the cost targets, such as
foreign currency exchange rates and inflation rates, may
also be considered. The contracting officer should assess
the reliability of the contractor's estimating system and
the extent of the contractor's cost reduction initiatives
(e.g., competition advocacy programs, dual sourcing, spare
parts pricing reforms, value engineering) . In evaluating
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cost control management, the contracting officer should
consider the adequacy of the contractor's management
approach to the control of cost and schedule. Conditions
which might justify higher or lower values are discussed
below.
(A) Above Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a higher than normal value if the contractor can
demonstrate a highly effective cost control program. The
following are indicators that such a condition may exist:
the contractor provides fully documented and reliable cost
estimates; the contractor has an aggressive cost reduction
program that has demonstrable benefits; the contractor uses
a high degree of subcontract competition (e.g. , aggressive
dual sourcing) ; the contractor has a proven record of cost
tracking and control.
(B) Below Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a lower than normal value if the contractor
demonstrates minimal concern for cost control. The
following are indicators that such a condition may exist:
the contractor has a marginal cost estimating system; the
contractor has made minimal effort to initiate cost
reduction programs; the contractor's cost proposal is
inadequate; or the contractor has a record of cost overruns
or other indications of unreliable cost estimates and lack
of cost control.
(b) Contract Type Risk . This factor focuses on the
degree of cost risk accepted by the contractor under varying
contract types.
(1) Profit Base . The amount of profit for contract
type risk is computed by multiplying the value assigned by
the contracting officer times total allowable costs
excluding GSA expenses, IR&D/B&P expenses, and facilities
capital cost of money.
(2) Normal Values and Designated Ranges .
(i) The following normal values and designated ranges
are applicable to contracts that contain no provisions or









5% 4% to 6
3% 2% to 4
1% 0% to 2
.5% 0% to 1
(ii) For fixed-price type contracts that contain
provisions for progress payments, the normal value and
designated ranges shown below shall be used. The value
assigned by the contracting officer shall be further
adjusted by adding an amount to recognize the contractor's
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investment in working capital, as described in 215.970-
1(b) (4).
Normal Designated
Contract Type Value* Range*
Firm fixed-price 3% 2% to 4%
Fixed-price-incentive 1% ,0% to 2%
* Add working capital adjustment to value assigned
(iii) Time and material contracts; labor-hour contracts;
overhaul contracts priced on a time and material basis; and
firm fixed-price-level-of-effort-term contracts shall be
considered to be cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts for the
purpose of establishing a profit value for contract type
risk and shall not receive the working capital adjustment
described in 215. 970-1 (b) (4) . However, higher profit values
within the designated range may be justified to the extent
that portions of cost are fixed.
(iv) Fixed-price contracts with redeterminable
provisions should be considered as a fixed-price-incentive
contract with below normal conditions.
(v) In determining contract type risk, it is
appropriate to consider additional risks associated with
contracts for foreign military sales (FMS) which are not
funded by United States appropriations. For example, a
contract containing an offset arrangement with the foreign
country may expose the contractor to additional risk. The
contracting officer may recognize additional risk if the
contractor can demonstrate that there are substantial risks
above those normally present in DoD contracts for similar
items. If an additional risk factor is recognized, the
total profit factor for cost risk shall not exceed the
designated range limits established for each contract type.
The additional assigned value for contract type shall not
apply to FMS sales made by United States Government
inventories or stocks nor to acquisitions made under DoD
cooperative logistics support arrangements.
(3) Evaluation Criteria .
(i) When assigning a profit value, the contracting
officer should consider elements that affect contract type
risk such as: length of contract; adequacy of cost data for
projections; economic environment; nature and extent of
subcontracted activity; protection provided to the
contractor under contract provisions (e.g., Economic Price
Adjustment clauses) ; the ceilings and share lines contained
in incentive provisions. Conditions which might justify
higher or lower values are discussed immediately below.
(A) Above Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a higher than normal value in those cases where
there is substantial contract type risk. The following are
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indicators that such a condition may exist: efforts where
there is minimal cost history; long-term contracts without
provisions protecting the contractor, particularly when
there is considerable economic uncertainty; if the contract
includes incentive provisions (e.g., cost and performance
incentives) which place a high degree of risk on the
contractor.
(B) Below Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a lower than normal value in cases where contract
type risk is low. The following are indicators that such
conditions may exist: contracts involving a very mature
product line with extensive cost history; relatively short-
term contracts; contracts that contain provisions that
substantially reduce the contractor's risk; the contract
includes incentive provisions which place a low degree of
risk on the contractor. Considerations regarding contract
type risk on incurred costs are separately discussed below.
(ii) The contracting officer's assessment of contract
type risk shall address the extent that costs have been
incurred prior to definitization of the contract action (see
also 217.7503(b) (8)). This assessment shall include any
reduced contractor risk on both (A) the contract before
definitization and (B) the remaining portion of the
contract. The contracting officer should generally regard
the contract type risk to be below normal within the
designated range of the contract type. However, in cases
where a substantial portion of the costs have been incurred
prior to definitization, the contracting officer may assign
a value as low as 0% for contract type risk, regardless of
contract type. The contracting officer's risk assessment
may consider the limitations placed on the contractor for
the period prior to definitization.
(4) Working Capital Adjustment (Maximum Value 4%) . For
fixed-price type contracts that contain provisions for
progress payments, the contracting officer shall calculate a
working capital adjustment. This adjustment is added to the
contract type risk and it shall not exceed 4% of contract
costs. Although the working capital adjustment employs a
formula approach, the intent is only to give general
recognition to the contractor's cost of working capital
under varying contract circumstances, financing policies and
the economic environment. It is not intended to be an exact
calculation of such costs. The formula is discussed below.
Contract Costs
Multiply by Portion Financed by Contractor
Contract Costs Financed by Contractor
Multiply by Contract Length Factor
Working Capital Investment
Multiply by Interest Rate
Working Capital Adjustment
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(i) Contract Costs . This represents all allowable
costs, including contractor GSA expenses and IR&D/B&P
expenses (but not facilities capital cost of money) . The
contracting officer may adjust this amount where the
contractor has a minimum cash investment (e.g.,
subcontractor progress payments liquidated late in period of
performance) . The contracting officer should also consider
the degree which some costs are covered by special financing
provisions, such as advance payments, and special funding
arrangements on multi-year contracts.
(ii) Portion Financed by Contractor . The contractor's
share of financing is generally the portion not covered by
progress payments. Typically, this will be 100% minus the
customary progress payment rate (FAR 32.501-1). For
example, if the contract provides for progress payments at
7 5%, then the contractor's share of financing would be 2 5%
(100% minus 75%) . On contracts that provide progress
payments to small businesses or flexible progress payments
(252.232-7004), the contractor's share shall be computed
using the customary progress payment rate for large
businesses.
(iii) Contract Costs Financed by Contractor . Multiply
contract costs by portion financed by contractor.
(iv) Contract Length Factor . This factor represents the
period of time that the contractor has a working capital
investment in the contract. It is to be based on the time
necessary for the contractor to complete the substantive
portion of the work. The contract length factor is not
necessarily the period of time between contract award and
final delivery (or final payment) , as periods of minimal
effort should be excluded. It also should not include
periods of performance contained in option provisions. The
contracting officer should use the table below to establish
the contract length factor. On contracts with multiple
deliveries, the contracting officer should develop a
weighted average contract length. Sampling techniques are














21 months or less
22 to 27 months
28 to 33 months
34 to 39 months
40 to 45 months
46 to 51 months
52 to 57 months
58 to 63 months
64 to 69 months
70 to 75 months 2.65
76 months or more 2.90
(v) Working Capital Investment . Multiply the contract
costs financed by contractor by the contract length factor,
(vi) Interest Rate . The contracting officer shall use
the interest rate promulgated by the Secretary of the
Treasury (230.7003(c)). No other interest rate is
authorized.
(vii) Working Capital Adjustment . Multiply the working
capital investment by the interest rate. The result is the
working capital adjustment. It may not exceed 4% of
contract costs.
EXAMPLE
JIC Manufacturing is to be awarded a negotiated contract for
four assemblies. The contracting officer's prenegotiation
cost objective for each is $500,000. The period of
performance is 40 months with assemblies being delivered in
the 34th, 36th, 38th, and 40th month of the contract
(average period is 37 months) . JIC Manufacturing will
receive progress payments at 75% (contractor portion is
25%), and the current interest rate is 8%.
Contract Costs $2,000,000
Portion Financed by Contractor 25%
Costs Financed by Contrac • $ 500,000
Contract Length Factor 1. 15
Working Capital Investment $ 575,000
Interest Rate 8%
Working Capital Adjustment $ 46,000*
* Equates to 2.3% profit on total costs
(c) Facilities Capital Employed . The intent of this
profit factor is to encourage and reward aggressive capital
investment in facilities that benefit DoD. This factor
recognizes both the facilities capital to be employed by the
contractor in the performance of the contract and the
contractor's commitment to improving productivity. The
amount of recognition is differentiated among asset
categories in proportion to the potential for productivity
increases. In addition to the net book value of facilities
capital employed, the contracting officer may consider
facilities capital that is part of a formal investment plan
if the contractor submits reasonable evidence that (i)
achievable benefits to DoD will result from the investment,
and (ii) the benefits of the investment are included in the
forward pricing structure.
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(1) Profit Base . The profit amount for facilities
capital employed is computed by multiplying the values
assigned times the allocated facilities capital attributable
to buildings and equipment, as derived in DD Form 1861,
"Contract Facilities Capital Cost of Money" (see 230.7004).
(2) Normal Values and Designated Ranges .
(i) Except as provided in 215.970-1 (c) (2) (ii) , the
normal values and designated ranges for land, buildings, and
equipment are as shown below.
Normal Designated
Asset Type Value Range
Land 0% N/A
Buildings 15% 10% to 20%
Equipment 35% 20% to 50%
(ii) It is recognized that the method used to allocate
facilities capital cost of money may produce
disproportionate allocation of assets to research and
development and services efforts which are being provided to
the government by highly facilitized manufacturing firms.
In such cases the contracting officer should use the
alternate normal values and designated ranges shown below.
Normal Designated
Asset Type Value Range
Land 0% N/A
Buildings 5% 0% to 10%
Equipment 20% 15% to 25%
(iii) If the contracting officer selected the alternate
for performance risk (215. 970-1 (a) (2) (ii) ) , no profit for
facilities capital employed may be assigned.
(3) Evaluation Criteria . The contracting officer's
assessment should relate the usefulness of the facilities
capital to the goods or services being acquired under the
individual contract action, as well as to the broader
perspective of defense programs. The contracting officer
may assign any appropriate profit value within the
designated range. It is expected that the maximum values
will be restricted to those cases where the benefits of the
facilities capital investment are substantially above
normal. The contracting officer should analyze the
productivity improvements and other anticipated industrial
base enhancing benefits resulting from the facilities
capital investment. The assessment should consider the
economic value of the facilities capital, such as physical
age, undepreciated value, idleness, and expected
contribution to future defense needs. The contractor's
level of investment in defense related facilities as
compared with the portion of the contractor's business which
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is derived from DoD may be a useful indicator for the
contracting officer in evaluating the contractor's
commitment to improving the productivity of defense program
efforts. The contracting officer should consider any
special protection provisions that may be included in the
contract which reduce the contractor's risk of investment
recovery (termination protection clauses, capital investment
indemnification, productivity saving rewards (215.872)).
Conditions which might justify higher or lower values are
discussed below.
(i) Above Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a higher than normal value if the facilities
capital investment has direct and identifiable benefits
which are considered exceptional. The following are
indicators that such a condition may exist: new investments
in state-of-the-art technology which reduce acquisition
costs or yield other tangible benefits such as improved
product quality or accelerated deliveries; investments in
new equipment for research and development applications; or
the contractor can demonstrate that the investments are over
and above the normal capital investments necessary to
support anticipated requirements of DoD programs. A value
significantly above normal may be justified when there are
direct and measurable benefits in efficiency and
significantly reduced acquisition costs on the effort being
priced.
(ii) Below Normal Conditions . The contracting officer
may assign a lower than normal value if the facilities
capital investment has little benefit to DoD. The following
are indicators that such a condition may exist: allocations
of capital which are predominantly applied to commercial
product lines; furniture and fixtures, home or group level
administrative offices, corporate aircraft and hangars,
gymnasiums; old facilities or extensive idle facilities. A
value significantly below normal may be justified when a
significant portion of defense manufacturing is done in an
environment characterized by outdated, inefficient, and
labor-intensive capital equipment.
(iii) The contracting officer shall ensure that increases
in facilities capital investments are not merely asset
revaluations attributable to mergers, stock transfers, take-
overs, sales of corporate entities, or similar actions.
215.970-2 Instructions for Completing DD Form 1547. The DD
Form 1547 not only assists the contracting officer in
establishing a profit objective under the Weighted
Guidelines Method, but it also serves as the principal
source document for reporting profit statistics to DoD's
management information system. It is essential that this
form be prepared accurately.
91
(a) General Guidance . The items contained on the DD
Form 1547 shall be completed as shown below. All amounts
are those related to the price of the contract action
without regard to funding status (e.g., amounts obligated).
Option amounts for additional quantities shall be handled as
a separate contract action when exercised. Items marked
with an asterisk (*) do not have to be completed by the
contracting officer if exempted from the profit reporting
requirement (204.673-3). In some cases, the information
required will be identical to information provided on the
related DD Form 3 50, "Individual Contracting Action Report."
(1) Item 1 - Report Number * . Each field contracting
office designated for profit reporting shall establish a
control system for consecutively numbering completed DD
Forms 1547. A number does not have to be assigned until
contract negotiations have been completed. This number is
intended to identify the specific DD Form 1547 in DoD's
management information system and will be used for follow-up
actions. The control number shall be four-digits starting
with 0001 at the beginning of each fiscal year. The four-
digit number shall be followed by a dash and the last two
digits of the fiscal year (e.g., 0004-87 for 4th action in
fiscal year 1987) . Numbers less than 1000 shall still be
assigned four digits (e.g., 0004, 0055, 0123).
(2) Item 2 - Basic Procurement Instrument Identifica-
tion No. (PUN) . This is a four-part designation in the
manner prescribed in 4 . 671-5 (b) (1) for completing DD Form
350. The parts are as follows:
Subitem A - Purchasing Office;
Subitem B - Fiscal Year (FY)
;
Subitem C - Type procurement Instrument Code (TPIC) ; and
Subitem D - Procurement Instrument Serial Number
(PRISN)
.
(3) Item 3 - Supplemental Procurement Instrument
Identification No. (SPUN) . Enter supplemental agreement or
other modification number in the manner prescribed for the
DD Form 350 in 204 . 671-5 (b) (2)
.
(4) Item 4 - Date of Action * . Enter the date when the
price of the contract action was negotiated in the following
manner:
Subitem A - Year: Use last two digits (e.g., 87 for
1987)
Subitem B - Month: Use two digit number (e.g., 03 for
March)
(5) Item 5 - Contracting Office Code * . Enter the code
assigned to the contracting office in accordance with DoD
Procurement Coding Manual, Volume 3.
(6) Item 6 - Name of Contractor * . Enter the name of
the contractor (including division name) in manner
prescribed for the DD Form 350 in 204 . 671-5 (b) (5)
.
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(7) Item 7 - Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS)
Number Enter number in the manner prescribed for the DD Form
350 in 204.671-5(b) (4) (i) .
(8) Item 8 - Federal Supply Code * . Enter the
appropriate Federal Supply Class or Service Code in
accordance with instructions shown in 204 . 671-5 (b) (8) (i)
.
(9) Item 9 - DoD Claimant Program * . Enter the code in
the manner prescribed for the DD Form 350 in 204.671-
5(b) (8) (ii).
(10) Item 10 - Type of Contract Code * . Enter the
appropriate code as follows:
Description Code
FPR (all types) A





CPIF (all types) V




Research and Development 2
Services 3
(12) Item 12 - Use Code * . Enter the appropriate code
for use of the Weighted Guidelines Method as follows:
Description Code
Alternate Performance Risk 1
Standard Facilities Capital Employed 2
Alternate Facilities Capital Employed 3
Alternate Structured Approach 4
Modified Weighted Guidelines Method 5
(13) Items 13 thru 20 - Cost Category . Enter the dollar
values of the prenegotiation objectives for each cost
category. All dollar values shall be expressed to nearest
whole value (e.g., $200,008.55 = $200,009). The amount for
G&A expenses in Item 19 shall also include contractor
IR&D/B&P expenses.
(14) Items 21 thru 29 - Weighted Guidelines Profit
Factors . Enter dollar values, factors, and percentages in
spaces provided. All dollar values shall be expressed to
nearest whole value (e.g., $200,008.55 = $200,009). The
contract length factor and all percentages shall be
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expressed to nearest hundredth (e.g., contract length factor
= 1.65 or interest rate = 8.25%).
(15) Total Profit Objective . Enter the total of items
24, 25, 26, 28, 29.
(16) Items 31 thru 3 5 - Negotiation Summary . Enter
dollar values and percentages as indicated. All dollar
values shall be expressed to nearest whole value (e.g.,
$200,008.55 = $200,009). Percentages shall be expressed to
nearest hundredth (e.g., profit rate = 10.25%).
(17) Items 3 6 thru 3 9 - Contracting Officer Approval .
All forms shall be signed by the contracting officer.
Include complete commercial telephone number (e.g., area
code) so that follow-up actions can be accomplished quickly.
(18) Items 96 thru 99 - Optional Use . These blocks have
been reserved for optional use by Military Services and
Agencies.
(b) Special Guidance .
(1) While it is recognized that fixed-price type
contract actions are negotiated on the basis of total price,
the negotiation summary portion of the DD Form 1547 shall be
prepared showing the contracting officer's best estimates of
cost and profit.
(2) Where multiple profit rates apply to a single
negotiation, a consolidated DD Form 1547 shall be prepared.
(3) The profit analysis for indefinite delivery-type
contracts is generally based on the annual requirements. If
the annual requirement is expected to exceed $500,000, a DD
Form 1547 summarizing cost and profit estimates for the
annual requirement shall be submitted.
215.971 Alternate Approaches to Weighted Guidelines Method.
As provided in 215. 902 (a) (1) (ii) and (iii), alternate
structured approaches may be used in lieu of the Weighted
Guidelines Method. The contracting officer shall adhere to
the provisions on profit factors and offset policy described
below. See also guidance on cost-plus-award-fee contracts
in 215.973.
215.971-1 Recognized Profit Factors. The basic structure
of the Weighted Guidelines Method establishes a uniform
approach for examining the three components of profit:
performance risk, contract type risk (including working
capital) , and facilities capital employed. Alternate
approaches should also consider these factors using the
general principles described in 215.970.
215.971-2 Offset Policy for Facilities Capital Cost of
Money. The values of the profit factors used in the
Weighted Guidelines Method have been adjusted to recognize
the shift in facilities capital cost of money from an
element of profit to an element of contract cost (FAR
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31.2 05-10). Reductions have been made directly to the
profit factors for performance risk. In order to assure
that this policy is applied to all DoD contracts which allow
facilities capital cost of money, similar adjustments shall
be made to contracts which use alternate structured
approaches. Therefore, the contracting officer shall reduce
the overall prenegotiation profit objective derived from
alternate structured approaches by 1% of total cost or the
amount of facilities capital cost of money, whichever is
less.
215.971-3 Instructions for Completing DD Form 1547. For
all selected field contracting offices identified in
204.673-3, the contracting officer shall report Items I
through 12 and 31 through 39 on all contract actions of
$500,000 or more. A DD Form 1547 is necessary, even where
an alternate structured approach is used because it is the
principal source document for DoD's management information
system on profit. Profit amounts in the negotiation summary
shall be net of offset for facilities capital cost of money
(215.971-2). Only the base fee shall be reported on cost-
plus-award-fee contracts.
215.972 Modified Weighted Guidelines Method for Nonprofit
Organizations
.
215.972-1 Procedures for Establishing Fee Objectives. It
is DoD's policy to establish the fee objective on defense
contracts with nonprofit organizations in a manner that will
stimulate efficient contract performance. To achieve this,
the contracting officer shall use the Modified Weighted
Guidelines Method described below. For purposes of applying
this method, a nonprofit organization is a business entity
which operates exclusively for charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes; whose earnings do not benefit any
private shareholder or individual ; whose activities do not
involve influencing legislation or political campaigning for
any candidate for public office; and is exempted from
Federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
(a) The contracting officer shall use the guidelines
described in 215.970 but make the following adjustments to
the fee objective:
(1) If the standard performance risk factor is used
(215.970-1 (a) (2) (i) ) , the fee objective shall be reduced by
an amount equal to 1% of total costs, excluding G&A
expenses, IR&D/B&P expenses, and facilities capital cost of
money. If the alternate performance risk factor is used
(215. 970-1 (a) (2) (ii) ) , then the reduction shall be 2%.
(2) The designated range for the contract type risk
shall be -1% to 0% of total costs, excluding GSA expenses,
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IR&D/B&P expenses, facilities capital cost of money, for a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with nonprofit organizations or
elements that have been identified by the Secretary of
Defense or Secretary of a Department, or their designees, as
receiving sustaining support on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis
from a particular Department or Agency of the Department of
Defense.
(b) In addition to the fee amounts computed in 215.972-
1(a) above, the contracting officer shall consider the need
for fee on contracts to be awarded to a nonprofit
organization designated as a Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC) . Such consideration shall
include the FFRDC s proportion of retained
earnings, as established under generally accepted accounting
methods, that is relatable to DoD contracted effort. The
need for fee may be based on the FFRDC s facilities capital
acquisition plans, working capital funding as assessed on
operating cycle cash needs, contingency funding, and
provision for funding unreimbursed costs deemed ordinary and
necessary to the FFRDC.
215.972-2 Instructions for Completing DD Form 1547. A DD
Form 1547 shall be prepared on all contract actions using
the Modified Weighted Guidelines Method if the applicability
criteria specified for structured approaches in 215.902 are
met. The instructions contained in 215.970-2 should be
applied. Fee amounts included in the negotiation summary
shall be net of offsets and need for fee considerations.
215.973 Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts. The policies and
procedures for establishing fee provisions on cost-plus-
award-fee contracts are contained in FAR 16.404-2. Although
these procedures prohibit application of the Weighted
Guidelines Method to costplus-award-fee contracts, and
similarly the general guidance on alternate structured
approaches contained in 215.971-1, the offset policy for
facilities capital cost of money shall apply. Therefore,
the contracting officer shall reduce the base fee on cost-
plus-award-fee contracts by the lesser of (a) 1% of total




POD PROFIT POLICY INDUSTRY SURVEY
Please make appropriate responses to the questions below,
am interested in your views on how the questions apply to
your company.
1. Does current DoD profit policy provide adequate
incentive for capital expenditures on equipment and
facilities?
2. Is profit policy the appropriate tool for incentivizing
capital investment?
3. Have there been any changes in company policy to benefit
from the higher values now applied to facilities capital
employed?
4. Are there opportunities or needs to make capital
investment decisions at this time?
5. For defense contracts, what criteria/factors does your
company consider prior to making capital expenditures in
facilities and equipment.
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6. What differences, if any, are there in capital
investment decisions between defense and commercial
segments?
7. How important is DoD profit policy as a factor in
deciding on expenditures on capital equipment?
8. Does your company use DoD's weighted guidelines to
substantiate your profit/fee objectives on negotiated
contracts? If not, what determines negotiated profit/ fee
levels?
9. How can profit policy, in particular the weighted
guidelines, be changed/modified to provide an incentive for
investing in capital facilities and equipment?
10. In your opinion, are Government negotiators applying the
weighted guideline factors to facilities capital employed in
accordance with DoD profit policy.
11. Has DoD's decision to emphasize investment in facilities
capital employed influenced your company's decision to
invest in capital facilities and equipment?
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APPENDIX C
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT PERSONNEL PROFIT POLICY SURVEY
Background Questions





How many years experience do you have in defense
contracting?
3. What average dollar value contracts do you normally deal
with?
Less than 1 million 1
Between 1 and 25 million 2
Between 25 and 50 million 3
Between 50 and 100 million 4
Over 100 million 5
Profit Policy Questions
Please indicate the extent of your agreement or
disagreement for each of the following statements. Use the




4. Guidance on the use and application of DoD profit
policy is clear and understandable.
Contracting Officers have a good understanding of
2 3 4 5
agree no strong disagree strongly
opinion disagree
how to apply the weighted guidelines.
6. Contracting Officers have adequate information
available to justify higher or lower rates when
determining the weighted guideline facilities capital
employed factors.
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7. The weighted guideline factors for facilities
capital employed are sufficient in providing an
incentive for capital investment.
8. Profit policy is an appropriate tool for
incentivizing capital investment in more productive
facilities and equipment.
9. There is pressure on the contracting officers to
keep profits down.
10. The profit/ fee objective is more often determined
on past averages or history than on weighted guideline
objectives.
11. Profit/ fee determinations are often made before
the weighted guideline computations.
12. Current profit policy emphasis on facilities
capital employed has resulted in increased capital
investment.
13. Have you noticed a change in a contractors capital
expenditures because of the increased incentives in
facilities capital employed in DoDs profit policy? Why
or why not.
14. If you have any other comments on profit policy as an
incentive for capital investment or its implementation
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U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command
Warren, Michigan
U.S. Army Aviation System Command
St. Louis, Missouri
Naval Sea Systems Command
Washington, D.C.
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Washington, D.C.




Air Force Systems Command
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Elecronic Systems Division
Air Force Systems Command
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts
Balistic Systems Office
Air Force Systems Command
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